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No one in philosophy is ever completely original, 
obviously. The idea of philosophical originality is 
practically a contradiction in terms, if one takes the 
terms literally, since philosophy already presumes a 
history. An original thinker places himself within an 
existent current of philosophy and, cannot not 
presume something of the history of the attempts of 
his predecessors even in his own originality. 1  
 
I discuss my personal process of re-constructing a 
Christian theology in this book from a subjective point of 
view. Therefore, by re-constructing a Christian theology I 
mean engaging dialectically with the world I have inherited 
and the world that I subsequently create for myself. Within 
this process, in fact, I am in dialogue with two subjective 
worlds, as it were. The world that I have inherited is 
subjectively interpreted; the world I construct is subjectively 
created. In the process of constructing Christian theology, I 
contrast contemporary theological understanding to 
traditional theological understanding that has become 
inordinately influenced by Hellenistic, or Ancient Greek 
philosophical understanding. Leslie Dewart’s efforts at 
dehellenization are an attempt at a new philosophical 
construction within theological knowledge. 2 Drawing on his 
insights, I concentrate in this work on the way belief has 
been shaped by relational, as opposed to merely ideological, 
forces. Hence, “roles” as opposed to “goals” are the subject 
of my attention. My theological construction is based upon 
human insight that has come into being with the advent of 
society and, in particular, Western or Hellenistic society. 
That is to say, my process of theological construction is one 
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that is critical of copula verb “to be.” For, “to be,” means to 
be some-thing joined to, or connected with, an underlying 
reality. This investigation of contemporary theological 
construction reveals that a particular dichotomous 
philosophy has mistakenly become regarded as necessary 
for theology. This philosophical error may be corrected by 
viewing understanding as a unified phenomenological 
activity, not as a dichotomous scholastic or theoretical 
activity. This is a difficult task for the contemporary thinker 
and requires effort because “the intuitive view is that there is 
a way things are that is independent of human opinion, and 
that we are capable of arriving at belief about how things are 
that is objectively reasonable, binding on anyone capable of 
appreciating the relevant evidence regardless of their 
ideological perspective.” 3  
The personal process of constructing Christian theology 
arises within my experience. My experience may be 
negative or positive which in turn affects my understanding 
and subsequent social construction. Reflecting upon my 
experience negatively, I may conclude that my civilization is 
dying. Things are not the way they once were. Life is 
decadent. The Christian moral values that I once 
acknowledged publicly are challenged within my society 
and often appear as conflicting opinions. Media headlines 
suggest to me that, world destruction is near given the 
perpetual state of war and conflict in which my world seems 
to be engaged. The moral principles that formerly held my 
life together seem to be disintegrating as the traditional 
supports of my social life are undermined.  
Reflecting on my experience positively, the world goes 
on because I, like the ordinary person, am cheerful and 
optimistic. The ordinary person believes that life is good and 
he or she feels a part of a larger rhythm of creation despite 
its apparent corruption. Ordinary people do experience an 
abundance of the life in which they participate. Often this 
optimistic attitude is expressed in religious life, that is, 
vowed life, or in a secular and respectful attitude toward life 
and creation in general. Devout people often experience 
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religion as one reality among others, such as the 
philosophical, political and economic movements that have 
characterized human development throughout the ages.  
Scholarship and the process of theological construction 
are not ends in themselves. Each is a human intellectual and 
social activity. Neither produces any philosophical system. 
Neither is permanent but only supplies temporary points of 
view that are contingent upon the cultural context of the 
thinker. Once I have given meaning to my experience I have 
entered the realm of philosophical discussion. Philosophical 
discussion is an activity reserved to humans living in 
society. Brute animals, because they lack a philosophical 
sense, cannot attribute meaning to their experience. The 
members of human societies and institutions intentionally 
relate themselves to the events within their common 
experience. The simpler stages of anthropological and 
cultural development, such as, tilling, fabricating tools and 
shelters, along with the rearing of the young, become 
established as habitual intentional activities as time goes on. 
These stages, in due time, gave rise to new experiences and 
subsequent interpretation that demanded further re-
adjustment within a given society, or within the institutions 
of that society. Thus, the human world continually becomes 
more philosophically complicated in its theological 
construction and this affects the religious lives of its 
inhabitants.  
In the process of constructing Christian theology I do not 
suggest a metaphysical ideology as the basis for theological 
construction. Theological construction is rooted in 
philosophical wonder that is prior to the formulation of any 
metaphysical ideology. Philosophically speaking, the 
Psalmist has it right, I believe. “What is man that you should 
care for him?” 4 Further, the inquiry into human nature is 
prior to the inquiry into divine nature. As I come to realize 
the need to possess my own soul, as Augustine did, I seek 
God in which to rest my soul. 5 Existentially, I am linked to 
an earlier age in theological construction and I recognize 
that present day problems are simply the logical outcome of 
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the so-called Modernist Crisis of a not so-long-ago age. In 
the process of my theological construction, I relate then to 
experiential issues arising out of theological Modernism and 
not speculative philosophical problems.  
My Christian theological construction is based upon 
God’s revelation within the ecclesial context. The ecclesia is 
formed by being “called out” of the general social context or 
cultural milieu in response to the divine summons. This 
being “called out” in response to the divine summons gives 
Christian theological construction its unique character and 
capacity to express God’s revelation. All social institutions 
are the means whereby individuals are able to relate to each 
other. Family, government, church, agriculture, trade, etc. 
are examples. The decay or the growth of any one of them 
will have a corresponding affect on the individuals making 
up the social institution. Theological construction cannot 
take place in a self-defensive and self-isolating context 
characteristic of decay. Rather, it needs a constructive and 
supportive context characteristic of growth. The faith of 
individuals, I included, needs the instruction and 
nourishment provided through divine revelation. In 
undertaking this reflection, I am not intending a devotional 
or pious work, nor do I intend an exclusively professional 
academic and philosophical one. However, I do intend to 
address the educated and theologically interested reader. I 
do this inspired by Leslie Dewart and through the original 
insight of George Tyrrell. Of George Tyrrell (+1909) more 
will be said later. In short, this book is an attempt to satisfy 
my intellect where traditional understanding seems to have 
failed.  
My contemporary Christian theological construction is 
based on my “style of life,” not upon the natural or 
supernatural schema of traditional theological 
understanding. Christian theological construction must 
occur in a specifically religious context. Further, theological 
construction is proper to human beings, who cannot help but 
discover themselves as being Christian or non-Christian. 
Theological construction discloses the humanitarian 
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characteristics of self-discovery that distinguish the thinking 
animal from the brute animal. Thus, Christian theological 
construction possesses its own special worth with respect to 
knowledge and human action. Christian theological 
construction, engaging emotion, feeling and intuition, 
enables me to encounter that which is transcendent as my 
consciousness extends beyond my sensible experience. The 
purpose of this book is to relate my efforts towards 
formulating a correct process for Christian theological 
construction thus avoiding the distortions of past ideology, 
of present fantasy and, uncritical “new age” thought.  
Christian theological construction presumes that a 
relationship between God and humanity has actually been 
established and has taken on the special features of unique 
personal self-discovery with distinctive insights. Therefore, 
I must exercise critical discernment in forming theological 
constructions based on my experience. Christian theological 
construction meets my personal needs when: 1) its purpose 
is related to my actual experience, 2) its purpose is 
discovered within my social relationships, 3) its purpose is 
to serve a further definite practical function of spiritual 
growth.  
My personal process of Christian theological 
construction starts with the established relationship between 
the risen Christ and me. I must undertake the task of 
theological construction and may do so, without error, only 
insofar as I have learned to enter the corporate faith reality 
of the ecclesia. Since my process of contemporary Christian 
theological construction needs to be set within the proper 
background, before discussing the characteristics of my 
contemporary theological construction, I shall present the 
understanding of theology that has influenced this work.  
  
An Understanding of Theology  
 
Theology began as a professional activity with the 
formation of the universities. Initially, it was undertaken 
informally within the ecclesiastical context, the vocational 
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guild, as it were and, its purpose was to serve the Church in 
establishing and formalizing her doctrine and dogma. 
However, I understand theology to be an evolving social 
construction which clarifies doctrine and dogma. My current 
intent is to re-think theology within an ecclesial context of 
faith and do so outside the ecclesiastical guild of an earlier 
theological age. As I use them the phenomenological term, 
ecclesial, reflects relationships as constitutive of the 
Christian communal life. The classical term, ecclesiastical, 
refers to the historically conditioned structure governing the 
Christian community. The doctrinal and dogmatic 
formulations extant in most ecclesiastical institutions are 
founded on a classical theological ideology. As a 
consequence of this foundation over the centuries there have 
been various rhetorical accretions that have clouded 
reflection in theology. These accretions developed into 
theological understandings that did not always relate well to 
contemporary experience of theologians. Therefore, the 
theological reflection that I undertake today in an ecclesial 
context must differ from the reflection that took place in a 
traditional ecclesiastical context.  
The way in which I conduct my contemporary 
theological reflection outside of the theological guild is 
through critical reflection. Critical theological reflection 
itself is a unique human activity and an innate capacity of 
the human mind. Critical reflection engages theologians, 
philosophers and psychologists to probe into the depths of 
the mind to disclose an “other.” Critical theological 
reflection discloses the believer’s best efforts at constructing 
an authentic Christian anthropology. As a believer, this 
authentic Christian anthropology discloses an understanding 
of human life and purpose that enables me to evolve as a 
member of humanity. Thus, critical reflection in theology 
has three humanitarian purposes for me. The first is to relate 
humanly to my actual experience. The second is to disclose 
truth as a human relationship. The third is to grow spiritually 
within an ecclesial community.  
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In this book I reflect upon my experience outside the 
traditional philosophical mould of an ecclesiastical guild. I 
have rejected the form of expression of an earlier Medieval 
Christian theology, influenced, as it is, by outdated 
Aristotelian categories. Such theology lacks resonance with 
contemporary cosmology as has been noted by Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin. 6 Additionally, by reflecting outside 
the guild, I have avoided the accretions of disputed 
ecclesiastical, political and power-related issues that 
emerged in the Reformation and counter-Reformation but 
which today are no longer relevant. Thus, in my context I 
have opened the way for new reflections and theological 
investigations. In reflecting on my religious experience I 
take seriously the notion that the Enlightenment period, 
which began in Europe, has introduced by virtue of its 
epistemological, historical, and evolutionary development 
legitimate expressions of religious experience. In North 
America, given its historical and theological patrimony, 
theologians are intellectually connected in their thinking to 
problems traceable to the philosophical and theological 
context prevalent in preVictorian England. During this time 
and well into the reign of Queen Victoria (1837—1901), 
England remained virtually isolated from Continental and 
theological philosophical thought. However, a critical 
examination of English philosophical and theological texts 
of that period reveals some influence of German thought.  
At the beginning of the 19th century, Rationalism was in 
vogue in England and on the Continent. In his review of 
religion in the Victorian era, Elliot-Binns distinguishes two 
strains of rational thought that were hostile to religious, and 
in particular Christian, experience. One train of thought was 
the overt and complete rejection of the whole Christian 
system, typical of France. The other train of thought, which 
was typical of Germany, tolerated Christianity but gradually 
reduced it to a mere caricature of its former self. 7 The 
existential and less rationalistic Germanic thought that later 
evolved into phenomenological philosophy under the 
influence of Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl 
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resonated with the English theologian George Tyrrell. 
Although he died before any formal development of the 
phenomenological school of thought in England, his 
thinking was definitely heading in that direction.  
In constructing my philosophical position, I follow 
closely the existential way of thinking noted by W. K. C. 
Guthrie. He reminds his readers that philosophers do not 
think in a void. In fact, their thoughts are products of three 
interrelated factors: their temperaments, their experiences 
and, their reading of previous philosophers all of which 
make up their life-world. 8 One of the pioneers of the 
phenomenological and existential method of philosophy was 
Edmund Husserl. He taught that philosophers can reflect on 
all experience, inasmuch as it presents itself to 
consciousness, according to a clear methodological 
framework since all knowledge appears within a complex 
series of cultural contexts. Phenomenological philosophers 
urge that the world of experience takes precedence over the 
abstracted and theoretical world of the sciences. Langdon 
Gilkey notes that, from a personal perspective, the public 
task of the theologian is primarily the analysis of life with 
regard to its religious issues and dimensions and, only 
secondarily as an analysis with regard to economic, 
sociological or psychological dimensions, although each of 
these has a religious basis and ground. 9 As a 
phenomenological philosopher and theologian I conclude, 
therefore, that an existential reflection on constructing 
Christian theology in the contemporary world, although 
undertaken individually, is not a private enterprise.  
The theological style of this book falls within Jeff 
Astley’s understanding of doing “ordinary theology,” which 
pays attention to personal insights arising out of experience 
and theological thinking. Ordinary theology takes place 
outside the traditional guild. According to Astley, original 
theology is rarely done. He maintains that theological 
thinking today is often undertaken as the study of other 
people’s ideas, which is not a self-critical reflection on one’s 
own particular religious experience and ideas. 10 Although 
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modern theology may have begun in the academy, it cannot 
remain in the academy as John Apczynski has shown. 11 
Theology given its purpose, must address the questions, 
problems, and data that arise within all aspects of human 
society. The thought of any theologian, (and in the final 
analysis this means anyone trying to understand his or her 
own ultimate meaning), emerges from the lebenswelt (life-
world) of the individual. A theologian’s lebenswelt forms 
the existential milieu, in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s sense, 
of the cultural, social, and religious context of life.  
Theologians are continually searching for new and 
meaningful ways to reflect upon religious experience 
outside the traditional theological guild. In my approach to 
theological understanding I do not consider the legacy of the 
past as hardened and dead with respect to the present any 
more than I ignore the lives of those critical thinkers who 
have shaped the past. Although they are physically dead, 
from the perspective of a contemporary theological 
construction, the legacy of those critical thinkers who 
shaped the past continues to shape the present. Their 
theological legacy is significant not by virtue of 
ecclesiastical endorsement, but by virtue of its relevance to 
our present time and experience. Theological construction 
within an ecclesial context, which is greater than the mere 
guild, must be in dialogue with artists, musicians, novelists, 
poets, psychologists, and always with the Scriptures. I draw 
on Marshall McLuhan’s insight:  
One thing which characterized the finer arts—poetry, 
painting, music—areas with which we’re all familiar—for 
more than a century, but certainly for the past century, has 
been a continued insistence on their relevance to daily 
living. There has been quite an impressive chorus of urgent 
requests in all fields that we take seriously the arts as basic 
social factors of enlightenment and guidance and training. 12  
It is quite clear then, to my mind, that my contemporary 
theological construction must incorporate aspects of the 
human temperament, experience, and understanding of both 
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past and current philosophers and theologians within the 
Western cultural context.  
Eventually, in the course of history the initial diverse 
theological understanding of the ecclesia developed into a 
uniform theological construction that became normative for 
the Christian life, particularly in the Western Church. For 
example, the two early diverging and distinct schools of 
theology, the Alexandrian and Antiochene schools, came 
into being over Christological controversies. These schools 
reflected their respective cultural understandings. As well, 
these schools were never homogenous groups. As M. C. 
Steenberg notes, homogenous schools never existed in the 
concrete sense. Theologians within them may have managed 
to encompass convergent themes and approaches, but they 
never developed a uniform system. 13 The presence of these 
schools indicated that diversity was an integral aspect of the 
ecclesia’s theological construction for some time after the 
death of the apostles. As the ecclesia evolved it interpreted 
its experience and theologically constructed itself-
understanding in different fashions. Between the Judaic and 
Hellenistic world-views, a theological rapprochement 
prepared the way for a new articulation of the Christian life. 
No longer was the imminent return of Jesus the main focus 
for reflecting upon the Christian life. An interpretation of 
the Christian life, which drew heavily on Hellenistic 
philosophical ideas, subsequently cast the Christian life in a 
new light. And in turn, this affected theological construction 
within the ecclesia. The influence of Hellenistic 
philosophical ideas continued in the Church for centuries. 
As Brian Gaybba has pointed out, the various schools of 
reflection on the theological construction of the Christian 
interior life were developing long before the Reformation 14 
The Franciscans and Dominicans were the two dominant 
schools, among others, which had developed to advance the 
theological perspectives of particular religious orders.  
In the Middle Ages, a change in the structure of 
theological understanding concerning the Christian life 
came about with the controversial introduction of Aristotle’s 
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philosophy. The scholastic method of interpretation, 
influenced by Aristotelian and Platonic thought patterns, 
was the best tool for intellectual argument in that age. 
Aristotelian and Platonic thought patterns were presented 
within Thomas Aquinas’s theologically constructed 
synthesis of Aristotle’s cosmology and the Christian 
message. One consequence of his theological construction 
was that Thomas relegated spiritual or mystical theology to 
a subdivision of moral theology. Eventually this theological 
approach became dominant in the Roman Church. To my 
mind, it is significant that through the acceptance of 
Aristotle’s cosmology, Christian theology produced a very 
“act-centred” message that was never fully realized, nor 
theologically understood, by the faithful. Consequently, 
reflection on the Christian life developed into various static 
legalisms. Sandra Schneiders points out that this 
theologically constructed medieval synthesis held together 
until the middle of the 20th century, when the culture-
shattering events of the two world wars, the technological 
revolution, various liberation movements, an explosion of 
knowledge and, the rapid developments in the humanities of 
philosophy, psychology and other social sciences, all 
together brought this comprehensive hold of the medieval 
synthesis on the Christian mind and imagination to an end. 
15 Out of this new non-scholastic milieu diverse theological 
ways of thinking have been constructed and now re-shape 
the hermeneutic of Christian theology.  
My critical reflection on the Christian theology often 
leads me to ask: Is church membership a prerequisite for 
doing theology? Can I do theology outside of the revelation 
in Christ? Concerning theological construction in the 
ecclesia some Christians saw and, continue to see, the 
Invisible Church contained within the Visible Church. Yet, 
the Invisible Church certainly is not identical or co-
extensive with the Visible Church. That there are many 
souls within the Visible Church that do not belong to the 
Invisible Church and, that there are many souls not within 
the Visible Church that belong to the Invisible Church is 
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still a thoroughly orthodox and common saying,” notes 
Baron von Hügel. 16 Thomas Foudy has written of Tyrrell’s 
notion of the relationship between the Visible and Invisible 
Church: “For him the invisible Church here on earth does 
not extend beyond the limits of the visible Church except so 
far as faith extends; it includes all those who give God 
primacy in their lives.” 17 Nevertheless, in undertaking a 
critical reflection on the Christian life as ordinary theology 
both theologians and religious philosophers need to 
“enchurch” their thinking somehow. They need to do this in 
order to theologically construct the historically called 
community. Love for God provides motivation for studying 
theology, which is historically, for Continental theologians, 
at least, tantamount to schooling in the Christian interior 
life. Coming to understand the things of God out of love is 
the beginning and the root of all theology. In short, theology 
is not merely an academic programme of studies arising 
within the medieval universities. It has a practical 
dimension. Brian Gaybba reminds us that the phenomenon 
of Liberation Theology is rooted in love. “With the sure 
instinct given by Love, liberation theology has “whether it 
realizes it or not” retrieved the classic Augustinian tradition 
that only love gives full understanding of the things of 
God.” 18  
From the foregoing understanding of theology how do I 
relate truth to love? Truth is the result of God’s love for 
those in the world and, of those in the world whose practical 
learning is with the school of the Christian interior life. 
Further, practical learning within the school of the interior 
life invites the seeker to experience God’s love outside of 
his or her inherited religion. Seekers of God’s love are more 
likely to feel their relationship with God than to understand 
it. The Spirit of Christ helps seekers feel the truth and then 
formulate it. Once formulated, the Spirit of Christ helps all 
feel their way deeper into this formulated truth. Thus, the lex 
orandi, the rule of prayer, is more deeply understood as a 
product of the community’s, not the individual’s, 
experience. The lex orandi is the theological construction of 
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the community’s unfolding of the Christian interior life, not 
of an isolated and individual experience. Theological 
construction arising from community’s experience presents 
the criterion for theological truth. But, theological 
construction does not set the criterion for private judgment. 
For Christian life to be healthy and bear fruit it must unfold 
within a community and be connected to the theological 
construction that constitutes the community’s life. That is, 
the community is to be the school of the Christian interior 
life.  
 
My Personal Approach to Theology  
 
My personal theology does not consist in a doctrinal or 
dogmatic representation of ecclesiastical corporate ideas. 
My personal theology is a reflective account of my thinking 
as affected by the reading and digesting of texts of other 
theological philosophers. To illustrate my personal theology, 
I offer below a selection of reflections arising within an 
existential theology. Initially, my personal reflections 
seemed new to me but I soon discovered that similar 
reflections had been undertaken by William Gladstone 
(1809—1898) and George Tyrrell (1861—1909). Even 
though I am writing in 2009, William Gladstone, George 
Tyrrell and I share the same theological cultural context. 
During my undergraduate years at the University of 
Toronto, Leslie Dewart had introduced me, in his lectures, 
to the theme of dehellenization in philosophical and 
theological thinking. When I encountered the writings of 
William Gladstone and George Tyrrell, I discovered that in 
their own context they had embarked on this theme, in its 
broadest sense, which had not yet been named within 
Western theological and philosophical circles.  
In my personal approach to understanding theology, 
contemporary theologians, whether they are Jewish, 
Christian or Muslim have a personal responsibility to their 
respective communities. Since I am included among them 
my theological thinking must be carried on within, not 
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without, my community. Our communities mediate the 
experience of believers as they pass on to future generations 
the fruits of their theological reflection. In order for a 
theologian to be credible today critical reflective thinking is 
a requirement. I undertake critical theological thinking 
within an existential philosophy, which is a dehellenized 
philosophy. In addition to any interfaith theological 
discussion on revelation among Jews, Christians and 
Muslims, there is the further issue of critical reflective 
collaboration among all theological philosophers including 
those of non-monotheistic religions. Critical reflective 
collaboration is a clear, consistent, professional and 
systematic sharing of insights into the personal, but not 
private, experience of God. The sharing of such insights 
constitutes existential (dehellenized) theological discussion. 
Philosophy, among all the disciplines available to assist 
me in this task of constructing Christian theology in the 
contemporary world, is the most fundamental one. Since it 
reflects my personal belief, philosophy is to be preferred to 
other disciplines, such as sociology or psychology, in 
assisting me. This is so since philosophy is a personal, but 
not private, way of evaluating experience, whereas 
psychology and sociology are corporate ways of describing 
religious experience. The more recent disciplines of 
psychology and sociology, as “soft” sciences share scientific 
clinical roots. G. E. Newsom notes the advent of psychology 
as a new discipline bringing its own significance to the 
world of science. He writes: “There is another development 
of science, that of psychology, and especially of religious 
psychology, which has come in with the new century and 
which may well be as characteristic of this century as 
physical science was of the last.” 19 This is not the case for 
philosophy, which is the more ancient discipline. Existential 
philosophical questions, not idealist questions, preoccupy 
me today. Existential philosophical and theological ways of 
thinking are the means by which I evaluate my experience 
as a member of a community. Even so, I do not have all the 
right questions to ask much less all the right answers.  
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To my mind, within an existential theological 
understanding, what is said of Christian theology may be 
said, inter alia, of Jewish and Islamic theology. An 
existential theology transcends cultural expression and 
denominational religious traditions. That is to say, an 
existential theology is not reserved to those theologians who 
officially represent the organized and visible community. 
Further, existential theologians recognize that not all 
members of the visible church belong to the invisible church 
and vice versa. Christian existential theology, by 
transcending denominational and official corporate interests, 
is less likely to become enslaved to an institutional and 
political ideology. The primary locus of an existential 
theology is the word of God addressed to the believer in 
community. Not being a member of either of the Jewish or 
Islamic faith communities, I do wonder to what degree this 
transcendence of denominational, (or sectarian), interests 
occurs in their theologies. Existential theology is an 
abandonment of the classical model of traditional theology, 
which has often been a polemical promulgation of doctrine 
and dogma. To my mind, should theological thinking to fail 
at transcending institutional interests and become a mere 
servant of the visible corporate community, and not serve 
the believer, that failure is tantamount to a living death for 
both the community and believer.  
Existential theology must be distinguished from 
religious studies, which is a separate discipline in its own 
right. As a distinct academic discipline religious studies has 
its roots in the Western academic thinking characteristic of 
the mid to late 19th Century. In its pedigree are listed 
philology, linguistics, historiography, anthropology, 
ethnology, archaeology, and sociology. In the contemporary 
academic context religious studies seeks to describe 
religious belief within cultural terms and always with a 
concern for the corporate community. Theology, however, 
in the contemporary philosophical context and having been 
influenced by the Enlightenment and Reformation, seeks 
knowledge not from an ideological and rationalistic 
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perspective but from an existential and phenomenological 
perspective. However, despite this evolution of theology 
with respect to its role, for most professionals it is still 
perceived to be a service limited to persons preparing to 
minister in a particular religious community or corporate 
faith tradition. Within my philosophical perspective, 
however, I recognize the primary role of theology as 
rendering a ministerium verbi divini, that is, a service to the 
Word of God. That is, revelation, in its full sense of word 
and sacrament, is beyond mere service to the institutional 
community.  
Theology is nothing less than an understanding of 
personal religious experience, individually or collectively. 
As a reflection on experience, theology is not merely a 
theoretical discipline. As merely a theoretical discipline 
theology would be reserved to reflection on the Church’s 
corporate catechism, or on the ideological doctrine or dogma 
of a faith tradition. Reserving reflection to the Church’s 
catechism, or ideological doctrine or dogma, is more 
properly the domain of religious studies than theology. From 
an existential perspective, data that are the loci for 
theological reflection are not reserved to the classical 
philosophical disciplines studied by professional academics. 
Rather, all experiential data collectively provide a locus for 
theological reflection. For me as an existential theologian, 
there are certain existentialia, or existential experiences that 
constitute my life. They are fear, despair, love, hope, 
suffering, death, happiness, and guilt. Yet, these 
existentialia present only one part of my existence, the 
human part (a partis hominis). They are not of God’s part (a 
parte Dei) which is also present to my existence. Thus, as an 
existential theologian questions arise for me that require 
responses from each part, God’s and mine.  
Scripture, not the confessional idea, is the primary and 
necessary datum for an existential Christian theology. This 
is not to deny that confessional corporate ideology, known 
as tradition, provides important theological data. However, 
confessional corporate ideology is secondary. To my mind, 
20 
 
the former metaphysical attempts seeking to prove that God 
exists are futile in the contemporary world. Further, such 
attempts at a metaphysical philosophy that are not rooted in 
experience tell us nothing. The task of the existential 
theologian is not look for a polemical opportunity to prove a 
doctrinal point. Rather, the theologian’s task is to express 
and clarify the experience of faith, vis á vis scripture.  
In contemporary Western culture the Christian life may 
be legally private but it is ethically and morally public. 
Christian theology, therefore, is ethically and morally 
accountable within the public forum. The accountability of 
Christian theology, which brings about social transformation 
resulting in a new social construction of the public forum, 
arises from the personal relationship between the individual 
and the public community. My Christian duty, that is to say 
Christian response, is not restricted to certain aspects of 
ecclesial life. My Christian duty is nothing less than the 
response to my total ecclesial life that is shaped by the larger 
public community. This was the thinking of William 
Gladstone, the 19th Century British Prime Minister, of 
whom more will be said later.  
After Vatican II the Roman Catholic Church deliberately 
attempted to enter a conversation with other faith 
communities about religious meaning in the public forum. 
The theologians of Vatican II recognized that the Church is 
to serve humanity in its secular life.  This raised the issue of 
the Church re-defining her theology in the public forum. 
Writing before Vatican II, William van de Pol, a convert to 
Roman Catholicism, notes that the role of serving humanity 
in its secular life was already part of the Church’s practice 
although not necessarily evident to all. 20 Today, Christians 
are conversing, both intellectually and spiritually, with many 
other religious communities, both Christian and non-
Christian. From the late 19th century onwards the Catholic 
Church left, to some degree, its classical corporate self-
understanding, and took on a contemporary personal self-
understanding. To my mind, this change in perspective was 
significantly promoted by the so-called Modernist thinking 
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within Roman Catholicism. In understanding herself from 
an existential perspective the Church thus abandoned the 
previous notion that a single cultural norm, originating in 
ancient Rome, could continue to determine her self-
understanding.  
In the contemporary North American context, the 
corporate Church seeks to dialogue with partners holding 
common beliefs wherever they may be found. Tolerance, as 
many of us know, is a significant virtue in the North 
American civic tradition. However, in addition to its 
positive effect, tolerance may have a negative effect as well. 
Too much variation in public discourse fragments civic 
culture. It appears to me that a workable discourse in the 
public forum is lacking due to an exaggeration of tolerance. 
As well, too much variation in belief makes dialogue among 
partners extremely difficult. Further, the effects of an 
inordinate tolerance extend beyond national boundaries. 
Global Westernized culture lacks an accepted theological 
language about meaning, value and experience in order to 
host a successful discourse in the public forum. As a result, 
I, personally am not as influential in the public forum as I 
may have been in the past. This leads me to conclude that 
Christendom, my previous ecclesiastical context, is dead or 
at least dying. Even though I have been born into an 
ecumenical context, that has been well established and can 
easily be distinguished from a secular context, I still 
experience the lack of an ecumenical public language. This 
lack of an ecumenical public language makes discussions 
with non-Catholic Christian theologians difficult for me. To 
add to this difficulty, science, which sets the standard for 
contemporary secular discussion, does not give me answers 
to my deeper questions of meaning. I conclude that my 
deeper existential questions need to be answered by 
philosophers and theologians and not scientists.  
The Western intellectual tradition, from the Hellenists 
onwards, reflects a notion of an individual and collective 
humanum. This humanum is that which constitutes 
humanity. In the West it has been traditionally the goal of 
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society and government to enhance this humanum, through a 
humanitarian social construction of civic society. Only in 
the recent past has this goal been challenged by the concept 
of a sovereign individualism taking preference over the 
notion of an individual and collective humanum. However, 
in Christian existential theology, the idea of individual 
sovereignty is not an absolute goal. Rather, an individual 
must be subordinated to God in some manner. Gaudium et 
Spes: The Pastoral Constitution on the Church, of the 
Second Vatican Council taught that there is inherent value 
and meaning in the lives of individuals in this world. 
Gaudium et Spes notes that Christian humanitarianism is 
founded on the human dignity that is ultimately grounded 
through God’s revelation to the Christian community, not to 
particular individuals. The imitatio Christi, then, as a 
particular way of life, is an embodiment of a personal and 
collective role in a community. It is this personal and 
collective role that expresses the humanum within the 
contemporary Christian community. Being an existential 
philosopher I have two tasks of equal obligation. The first is 
to interpret the corporate tradition of the faith to which I 
belong and the second is to interpret my personal experience 
within that corporate tradition. In my interpretation, I have 
noted that the theological language, once inordinately 
influenced by the Enlightenment, has ceased to be solely 
theoretical and rational. Secondly, I note that contemporary 
theological language is no longer separated from the human 
and social sciences. Theological language has become a 
personal expression arising out of the encounter with the 
social sciences. Thus, I no longer think of the social sciences 
in merely mechanistic terms, but rather I now think of them 
in humanitarian organic terms.  
In my reflections I have come to agree with the thinking 
of Sarah Jane Boss who notes that in Western society 
holiness and sacredness are not perceived to be that 
important in the public forum. As I noted earlier a 
phenomenological understanding is an alternative to a 
theoretical understanding. A phenomenological 
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understanding, which is the same as an existential one, does 
not emphasize any acquisition of vocational skills nor does 
it emphasize the development of a more comprehensive 
understanding of the faith. The proper intent of an 
existential or phenomenological understanding is 
dehellenization of all things social which is nothing less than 
the conscious creation of the future of belief in holiness and 
sacredness in the public forum. This is a radically different 
view than the dominant one in our present North American 
culture.  
Originally, theological colleges were set up to serve the 
academic interests of the Churches in debating various 
theological opinions surrounding doctrine and dogma. 
However, today Christian theological education is being 
directed towards an existential formation of the whole 
person in having one’s mind conformed to Christ in such a 
way that praying and believing are one act. Given this role, 
Christian theology divorced from prayer is in trouble. A 
theology that arises from my experience of the Christian 
God contributes its own perspective to my conscious 
creation of the future of belief. In my experience, pastoral 
psychology and counseling, arising from an academic study 
of religion, address my emotional centre. However, neither 
psychology nor counseling addresses my spiritual centre. A 
pastoral theology rooted in an existential understanding, 
instead of psychology or counseling, helps me to order my 
life within the dimension of the sacred and what is holy. 
More attention to this will be given below.  
My philosophical reflections focus on the unfinished 
theological business of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, namely, the so-called Modernist 
Movement. This Movement arose from a tension between 
the personal and corporate theological understanding of 
Catholic theologians and the Church. It challenged the 
dominant corporate theological mind-set of the time with its 
roots in the scholastic tradition. As a result, the so-called 
Movement was terminated by the ecclesiastical authorities 
and had an insecure future among Catholic theologians. 
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However, many of the insights that have benefited the 
Church have arisen from the critical scholarship of the 
Catholic theologians of this period. One such insight is the 
attention paid to personal understanding, as opposed to 
corporate understanding, of the experience of the faith. 
Charles Healey notes Tyrrell’s contribution to the area of 
personal spirituality. 21 Given that Catholic theologians 
today accept such insights of critical scholarship is, in fact, a 
fulfillment of the hope of the Modernist theologian George 
Tyrrell. 22 However, to my mind the contemporary Catholic 
theological climate immediately prior to and since the 
election of Pope Benedict XVI seems to be developing away 
from such critical theological understanding. A particular 
denominational understanding, that is, the Roman, seems to 
be returning to take precedence over the ecumenical 
understanding of Vatican II. Unfortunately, this encourages 
a return to corporate understanding over personal 
understanding.  
  
The Existential Situation in Which I Find Myself  
 
I find myself in an existential situation that I have not 
made or designed, but have inherited. I know that I cannot 
stop its continual evolution. Also, I know that I am 
personally involved in its transformation. As a Western 
Christian, I live within the anxiety and tension that 
accompany the end of conventional Christianity. But within 
this tension, marking the end of conventional Christianity, I 
see indications of a new beginning leading to a new future. 
These indications signal the beginning of the process of 
dehellenization thus enabling the conscious creation of the 
future of my belief.  
My acceptance of the phenomenological notion of the 
person, as opposed to the classical notion, indicates a shift in 
my philosophical thinking. This shift took place later on in 
my ministry. About this same time there was also a shift in 
the understanding of that which I understood as sacred. I no 
longer consider as sacred the feudal and monarchical 
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society, which had given its social structure to the visible 
church. Rather, an industrial and democratic society, which 
gives its social structure to the visible church, is the society I 
consider sacred. Indeed, with this shift in my understanding, 
based on my experience, I now know that the true church is 
often to be found among those who have been 
excommunicated from the visible Church. Further, I 
acknowledge that those who are not members of the visible 
church may enjoy the benefits of her activity as a sacred and 
social institution. But, they are not direct sharers in her 
sacred activity. This does not mean to my mind, however, 
that those outside the visible limits of the Church are not 
members of the actual Church in some manner.  
As a Christian, I have no objective philosophy of my 
own, but must rely on that of the community. My personal 
philosophical reflections, however, arise out of the world of 
my subjective inner experience of my community’s 
objective philosophy. Similarly, I note that pagan religions 
have various philosophies to explain and interpret the 
experience of their adherents. As I noted above, Christian 
existential theology differs from Christian speculative 
theology in that existential theology takes human 
experience, as opposed to ideology, as its primary subject 
matter. Thus, given that as subject matter an ideological 
historical record is secondary, I consider the historical 
record as supplemental datum for reflection. In other words, 
my theological reflection belongs to the category of personal 
experience, not the category of an objective philosophical 
statement.  
In my existential encounter with God, I transcend the 
boundaries of my creaturely existence in such a way that I 
become more strikingly humanitarian. In other words, I 
understand myself holistically. Such holistic understanding 
is not reserved to mystics. Holistic understanding is at the 
center of Christian life. I have come to know God as I have 
come to know any other person, that is, through mutual self-
giving. This required a philosophical and theological 
response from me as God was revealed to me. However, as a 
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philosopher and as a theologian, I continue to respond to 
revelation differently. As a philosopher I respond to the 
existential probabilities offered through revelation, whereas, 
as a theologian I respond to revelation in the concrete 
phenomenon of existence. As with any personal 
relationship, the encounter with God defies objectivism, but 
not objectivity. I remind the reader that objectivism belongs 
to a non-dehellenized philosophy which preserves the past, 
whereas, objectivity belongs to a dehellenized philosophy 
that constitutes the present conscious creation of the future 
of belief. If I factor out the conscious creation of the future 
of my belief I am taking away that which is most strikingly 
humanitarian in me, that is, that I am greater than the sum of 
my individual parts.  
  
Theology and the Individual in Community 
 
In the balance of this chapter I present my thoughts on 
the secondary role of the ministerium verbi divini noted 
above. Even though God is the primary one to be revealed in 
word and sacrament, I have reflected upon the philosophical 
response to revelation given by me in creating my future of 
belief. For many believers, our experience is that we are 
estranged from the religion we inherited. To my mind, this 
estrangement is due to the end of conventional Christianity 
and the death of the traditional concept of God. The cultural 
conventions developed and designed in the past to protect 
me from anxiety are inadequate and unsuccessful today. 
Often my experience leads me to conclude that God is not in 
his heaven and all is not well. In response to this state of 
affairs, new cultural safeguards are in the process of being 
created to meet my present needs. However, their success 
seems somewhat relative and somewhat limited. As an 
existential Christian philosopher and theologian, I do not 
accept the Gospel message as merely a product of culture. 
Yet, the Gospel message is largely a product of the cultural 
milieu in which it was formed. Contemporary forms of 
cultural expression, conceptions, and customs, as well as 
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Christianity’s spirit and mentality are rooted in the world of 
Greco-Roman-Germanic civilization, which in turn has it 
roots in Hellenic culture.   
Cultural influences notwithstanding, Catholic theology 
supplies an intellectual embodiment and expression of 
religious experience evoked by the preaching of Christ. The 
preaching of Christ remains substantially the same in my 
cultural experience even though Christ and I are separated 
by two thousand years of cultural differences. I understand 
that the Church’s religious teaching must be in harmony 
with the mind of the age and that religion is an ever-varying 
expression of individual spiritual experience. Yet, as a 
religion, Christianity is a doctrinal system and a collective 
construct of a human community. This doctrinal system is a 
construction, not of poetical, but of theological, 
philosophical, ethical, scientific and historical beliefs and 
conceptions evoked by the preaching of Christ. My critical 
reflective appreciation on theological construction leads to 
personal self-discovery, that is, to the act of seeing for 
myself and to the act of doing for myself. My task as a 
theologian is to clarify the intersubjectivity, which exists 
between God as subject and me as subject. My theological 
self-discovery can have a subsequent effect on the moral and 
social life of the community. History shows that almost all 
of substantial philosophical and theological advancement 
has not been the work of officials, but rather of self-
motivated individuals who have to some extent corrected 
and modified the system and often in opposition to 
officialdom.  
The philosophy, most suitable for me to disclose what I 
know, is phenomenology. As a philosophy of consciousness, 
phenomenology enables me to be conscious of my 
experience of the moment. Only with such conscious 
understanding can my Christian experience be meaningful. 
Phenomenology assists in discerning the meaning of me-as-
subject created in God’s image and likeness. As a 
philosophy of consciousness, phenomenology is proper for 
the Catholic tradition of theological interpretation. Natural 
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theology, on the other hand, is somewhat outside the 
Catholic tradition of theological thinking. Traditional 
Catholic theologians generally view natural theology more 
as a philosophy than a theology. This, it seems, was the 
mind of Tyrrell. John Root writes: “Before the critical year 
of 1900, Tyrrell wrote several articles in which he analysed 
the thought of popular evolutionists, criticized both 
Naturalism and Natural Theology.” 23 It could be argued that 
a special task of Catholic metaphysics, which does not 
belong to natural theology, but which is more properly 
phenomenological, is to show the grounds for the total 
consciousness of the world. Even so, Catholic theologians 
are not central to church’s life. The sensus fidelium is. The 
Church could get along without a professional theological 
class but it could not get along without the sensus fidelium.  
History shows that controversial issues in religion 
introduced by new scientific knowledge in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries were, in the American Church, at least, 
contested at the pastoral or practical level. To contest issues 
at the pastoral and practical level is characteristic of the 
North American temperament. However, the controversial 
issues in religion in France were contested at the level of 
theological argument, which is characteristic of the 
Continental temperament. These differing temperaments 
caused problems. One problem was that French thinkers 
could not understand the non-metaphysical or practical 
language of the North Americans. The French theologians 
tended to favour a theoretical and idealistic approach within 
their thinking. In England and the Continent, liberal 
Catholics attempted to integrate the new scientific 
knowledge within the teaching authority of the Church. The 
Modernists, it seems, attempted to reconcile the conflict 
between the Church and new scientific knowledge by 
altering the meaning of dogma and Church authority. Unlike 
Christian philosophy, Christian theology involves the 
process of Divine self-revelation. For the French and Italian 
Modernists, a life of philosophical study was natural and 
often followed upon the life of contemplative prayer. Many 
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Modernist theologians accepted that a saintly life replaced 
the importance of understanding theological doctrine and 
dogma. In Tyrrell’s time there was a trend developing, 
which is still somewhat in evidence today, away from 
professional theologians serving the doctrinal and dogmatic 
needs of the Church. That trend was, and is, to serve the 
existential and practical needs of the individual in 
community.  
The existential and practical needs of the believing 
community notwithstanding, theological construction has 
remained to a large degree a theoretical catechetical activity 
in the institutional Church. A theoretical catechetical 
activity is not primarily an activity of the sensus fidelium. 
Theoretical theological construction has deep roots going 
back to intertestamental times. The need to construct a 
theology in the Gentile-Christian Church arose from the 
belief that the conception of God as the Father of Christ and, 
of Christ as the Son of God, must be demonstrated 
positively as a universal truth of reason, even if rooted in 
pagan Hellenist philosophy. However, contemporary 
theology, as a human discipline needs to take into account 
all revealed religious experience, not just Christian. This is 
so since existential interpretive issues are common to all not 
just Christians. All believers are caught up in the existential 
transition to a new expression and practice of their faith. 
Classically, theology is a labor of reason that has recognized 
and included revelation as gift within the Jewish, Islamic 
and Christian perspectives. Still, it must be remembered that 
theology is an after-thought in our understanding. Tradition, 
notwithstanding, from an existential and ecumenical 
perspective it matters little that Christian theology has 
developed in Roman, Reformed and Protestant terms.  
An existential theology, within contemporary Christian 
ecclesiology, presents a perspective that brings about an end 
to the antithesis between Rome and the Reformation. Thus, 
the new Christian outcome may be neither Roman nor 
Reformed. I find this an exciting possibility for theologians. 
Any new Christian outcome would require an existential 
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posture similar to that recognized by Maude Petre who was 
sympathetic to the so-called Modernist movement. Within 
such an existential posture, however, a Christianity 
understood without Christ becomes, not a new Christianity, 
but a new social ideal. Christianity understood with a 
mystical, but not historical, Christ is not a new Christianity 
but another religion. Further, Christianity understood with 
Christ as a moral ideal, not worthy of worship, is not new 
Christianity, but an adaptation of Christian teaching to other 
religious or ethical systems. It is clear that in Christian 
theology certain developments, such as the new cults, are 
not proper evolutionary developments at all. Rather they are 
substitutions for authentic Christianity, which has a better 
chance of survival in its classical form rather than in any 
new cultic form. Contemporary Christianity needs an 
existential theology in order to take on proper interpretive 
tasks in this age. Otherwise it has no reason for existence. In 
our contemporary context, with an emphasis on the needs of 
the individual, there is a danger that the Church, as a social 
community, may be understood as unnecessary for the 
spiritual life. This need not be the case. One must not forget 
that it is through the Church as community that new 
generations are introduced to the Christian faith. It must not 
be forgotten that one task of a theologian is the scientific 
analysis of public life and of communal experience with 
regard to religious issues.  
Tertullian, the Carthaginian theologian, who died circa 
230 spoke of the “natural man” simple, rude, uncultured, 
untaught and, not yet ruined by Greek education as being 
anima naturaliter Christiana. Tertullian invited his readers 
to return to their individual religious experience given that it 
is prior to any thought or theory. In this return they could 
explore the spiritual life in order to find the Christian route 
to God. Similarly, as a philosophical thinker, Socrates 
desired to help clarify the thinking of poets, politicians and 
whomever he met in market place, young and old. We know 
that Socrates did not initiate a system of philosophy. Rather, 
he took a rational approach to thinking. At this point, I note 
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Kristina Stöckl’s timely observation. “Modern man is 
shaped by the Enlightenment, not only insofar as he has 
become autonomous in relation to preconceived foundations 
of a religious or traditional kind, but also to the extent that 
rationality itself has been recognized as not providing a 
foundation.” 24 Today, for many religious philosophers an 
existential issue is that God may have died in the mass 
culture of the nineteenth century. However, it is also an 
issue that God may return making use of new images and 
new symbols. Interpreting these new images and symbols is 
another task of the existential theologian.  
As a theologian, when I articulate these ideas and 
expressed them in a language that makes sense in 
contemporary Western culture, I discover that theology 
cannot do without a religious philosophy. With the 
assistance of an existential religious philosophy, then, the 
task of the theologian becomes a relative work. The work of 
the theologian today is conceived differently than in the 
days of the great theological systems, which dominated the 
Medieval universities. Developments in philosophy have 
always preceded developments in theology. Thus, there 
likely is no final philosophy or theology. To my mind, a 
primary task of the Christian theologian is to make known 
the great abiding truths of Christianity to a new generation. 
The principle merit and usefulness of theology is to satisfy 
the expectation of the Christian believer in this life. In 
attempting to satisfy the needs of the believer I make a 
distinction between the task of the theologian and the task of 
the spiritual counselor. The theologian answers needs 
arising within the revealed faith. The counselor answers 
needs arising within the human spirit. I am of the opinion, 
however, that an existential theology may address both 
within the context of a believing community.  
Contemporary social psychologists first ask in their 
inquiry: what were the experiences that presented 
themselves to unscientific minds? Secondly, they ask: what 
do these experiences that presented themselves signify for 
science? Theologians first ask in their inquiry: what are the 
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experiences that present themselves via revelation? 
Secondly, they ask: what do those experiences that present 
themselves signify for theology? In their thinking 
theologians may give a conscious account of their 
experience using psychology, yet never fully understand 
their experience as psychologists. This is so since no two 
theologians construct their life-world identically, but each 
constructs it as a unique centre of interest and meaning. 
When I became aware of this unique construction of the 
human world, which is an illusion from the point of view of 
classical philosophy, that is, it is a psychological fiction I 
recognized it reflected a different, not contradictory, order to 
things. In this different order of things, constituted by 
personal interest and meaning, I recognized my 
individuality, not individualism, as subordinated to, yet 
dependent upon, the collective interest. As well, within my 
experience these questions presented themselves: has 
philosophy’s role been taken over by psychology? Will 
psychology fail as a philosophy? These are questions, I 
believe, which have been raised in the experience of many 
other contemporary theologians.  
History shows us that relatively few individuals have 
developed a profound sense of personal connectedness with 
other persons and their physical or external world. 
Gemeinschaftsgefühl, or the sense of universal 
interrelatedness interpreted as ‘social interest,’ has never 
been formally taught Catholic theological schools. Heinz 
and Rowena Ansbacher have made the annotation that this 
term, coined by Alfred Adler (1870—1937), despite 
alternative translations, is most adequately translated as 
social interest, denoting “the innate aptitude through which 
the individual becomes responsive to reality, which is 
primarily the social situation.” 25 Much of our history, even 
though lived through democratic and religious institutions, 
has been preoccupied with the conquest and exploitation of 
the external world. This conquest and exploitation of the 
external world included people seen as objects. Power and 
might have been sought through covert and overt, 
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manipulative and competitive movements, which are 
exploitive. I can’t help wondering how different would the 
world be had our ancestors rejected Cartesian dualism, and 
opted for a holistic understanding. It often seems to me that 
my world has always been such that virtue is seldom 
rewarded. I often seem to lack the social interest of loving 
myself in ways that stimulate a charitable love for others. I 
seem to have philosophically victimized myself through an 
unworkable and false dichotomy between the temporal and 
spiritual, and between rejecting this world and loving God. 
To reject the world is impossible. However, I have come to 
realize that my spiritual life, or loving God, is such that it is 
not in the power of others to take it from me.  
The philosophical language of my theological 
construction is derived from in intelligible concepts. By way 
of contrast, my language inspired by revelation is derived 
from intuitions. Theological construction is a perennial 
intellectual phenomenon proper to each person who is 
spiritually alive and active. It is to be remembered that 
theological constructs, like all theoretical constructs, are 
merely a roadmap for future speculations. At times, 
contemporary theologians think somewhat as poets. Such 
theologians translate their intuition of reality into concrete, 
heart-moving images. However, following the mind of 
George Tyrrell, it is to the saints, and not the poetic 
theologians, that I attribute the growth of my Christian 
belief, which has been prefigured by the prophets. I do not 
understand “saints” to mean the canonized Saints of the 
Church who help me in my Christian belief. I agree with  
Maude Petre’s observation that Tyrrell’s appeal was to 
the mystical apprehension of the saint rather than to the 
closely-reasoned arguments of the theologian; and if, 
through all the vicissitudes of his mental career, he 
preserved a certain allegiance to St. Thomas, it was because 
he believed that at bottom the teaching of the great doctor 
was far more spiritual than the later developments of 
scholasticism. 26  
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As a matter of history canonized Saints have not always 
been the best moulders of the Catholic faith. Rather, the 
healthy growth of my faith depends upon the Christian Spirit 
which is present to various degrees in the lives of all the 
faithful. Thus, my spiritual progress reflects a deeper 
reading of myself and of reality. It is through transcending 
the illusion of an absolute being by the judgments of my 
conscience that I progress spiritually. Thus, there is no 
progress in goodness, that is, the loving of what is right. 
There is progress only in ethics, the doing of what is right.   
As I passed out of childhood, physically, mentally and 
morally, I became an adult agent. Further, as adult agent, I 
am also an agent and co-creator, not merely a creature-
agent. As co-creator I share in that divine agency which is 
consciously sympathetic and co-operative with the intentio 
naturae of which I am a part. Within the intentio naturae I 
distinguish between the “I” that lives as a separate human 
organism and the “I” that is a conscious subject and agent 
within the whole natural social process. Thus, not only am I 
capable of self-formation ab intra, but also am capable of a 
free self-adjustment to the universal good, ab extra. 
Theologically speaking, then, I am able to pass from the 
bondage of the law to the liberty of the Gospel. Many 
Christian mystics have felt the need to identify some 
invisible spiritual Church, some Communion of Saints, 
some mystical body of Christ, or organism of members 
manifesting the one and the same spirit in an endless variety 
of ways. This is not so in my case. But should this ever be 
the case that I become a part of such an invisible spiritual 
Church my separate self would necessarily communicate 
immediately with God.  
In the reformulation of my theological constructions, it 
is within the general life of the community that I am to look 
for that revelation of God, in Christ. To many people today 
the traditional concept of a transcendental God is quite dead, 
but there is a definite movement to encounter an imminent 
God. Related to this is a strong movement to find a language 
and a construct amenable to both secular humanists and 
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representatives of various religious groups. 
Humanitarianism, as opposed to humanism, provides a 
possibility for such a language and construction. The 
spiritual need for an object of devotion and a frame of 
reference for my spiritual experience suggest an innate urge 
proper to all humanity to worship something. I worship 
through faith since certainty is impossible. I suggest that 
humanitarianism is the most suitable term to describe the 
advanced state of maturity in which I feel myself as an 
integral part of humanity sharing past, present and future 
problems. From a humanitarian point of view the real 
question for me is: What does Catholicity do for my moral 
and spiritual elevation? The question is not: How many 
millions of people does Catholicism number among its 
adherents? The collective mind, sentiment, custom, and 
morality of a community or society, is an educational 
opportunity and standard for my individual mind. My mind 
must be formed upon this communitarian standard (the 
sensus fidelium in the case of the Church) which others 
must be able to recognize. In this way I am capable of 
critical reflection through which my community of faith 
may be improved and developed. To my mind, there is 
something in every individual, a sort of spiritual ambition 
and desire of true self-possession that makes one admire 
those who can suffer and endure life’s problems for the sake 
of truth and the principle love, or which is the same thing, 
the reconstruction of Christian theology.  
  
HEHELLENIZATION: THE PROCESS OF 
CONSTRUCTING CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY  
 
A Personal Reflection  
 
Having come to appreciate the influence of Leslie 
Dewart in my academic career, my intention now is to 
provide for the reader a reflective account of the 
development of my own philosophical thinking from my 
undergraduate years to the writing of this book. I make this 
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reflective account deliberately and consciously. My 
motivation to offer this reflection in the public forum is that 
there may be other philosophers, or theologians, with similar 
interests. I present this reflection not as a chronological or 
historical sequence of events that represent stages of my 
philosophical development over time but, rather, as an 
invitation for the reader, in light of the experience of reading 
this book, to revisit his or her own thinking. That is to say, 
dates and occasions marking my various philosophical 
conversions, that is, when I stopped believing “that” and 
began believing “this,” is not my intent here. Rather, I 
reflect on the existential context of a series of conscious 
realizations in my thinking that represent the 
phenomenological moments of insight that constituted 
essential changes in what I believe. My personal 
understanding of philosophy, which is in sympathy with that 
of Plato and Plotinus, is that philosophy is an intellectual 
and meditative activity. Further, this philosophical and 
meditative activity relates me to my environment from 
which I have become, in fact, differentiated. These 
philosophical and meditative activities have provided 
insights that have allowed me to construct and continue to 
re-construct a Christian theology.  
Like many other students down through history, I began 
my philosophical questioning during my undergraduate 
years studying classical philosophy, which I later came to 
reject. During these years, however, there was not an 
immediate and total rejection of classical philosophy. In 
practice, I took what “worked” from classical philosophy 
and rejected what was irrelevant to my experience of the 
day. Today, the rejection of what is irrelevant to my 
experience, or existential condition, unlike during my 
undergraduate years, is more thoroughly thought out and 
consciously maintained. Over time, I have come to agree 
with Christopher Macann that, from a philosophical 
perspective it is not that phenomena somehow manifest or 
present being to me in my experience, but rather that my 
experience of being manifests itself phenomenally. 27 Today, 
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I do not consider classical Hellenist ontological philosophy 
as the necessary and unique philosophical under pinning 
common to all human thinking. I once thought that to be the 
case, however. Now, I recognize that classical Hellenist 
ontological philosophy is only one point of view within the 
evolutionary process of the various philosophical 
perspectives that constitute human thinking.  
Like many philosophers of the Catholic tradition I 
sought contact with a metaphysical reality through a 
contemplative and transcendental philosophy, Thomism to 
be exact. In the initial years of my philosophical thinking, I 
accepted uncritically that reality was disclosed a priori in 
formal ideological structures that mediated my experience. 
However, I later came to realize that experience did not 
disclose, nor confirm, such structures that I had presumed to 
be there and affect my life. Instruction by Dr Leslie Dewart 
helped me understand that a phenomenological point of 
view did present, in practice, a disclosure of conscious 
relations within my life. I discovered that transcendental 
phenomenology is an approach that discloses the conscious 
relations that I do, in fact, construct. There were no a priori 
structures that revealed to me reality in itself. Thus, like 
René Descartes, I abandoned any ideology but did not 
assume a cogito or similar condition of doubt. In my case, 
self-reflection, which affirmed my conscious existence, 
replaced the Cartesian cogito as a moment of activity in my 
philosophical thinking. My conscious personal state became 
my “moment of activity” to understand and make sense of 
my experience. It is at this point, according to Stöckl that I 
truly entered the modern condition. “The notion of 
modernity as a condition refers to the experience of 
modernization and to a critical reflection upon this 
experience. Modernity in this sense stands for the present 
condition in which the self finds itself in and for the task of 
having to make sense of this condition.” 28 Such 
understanding and making sense of experience is limited to 
the immediate context. This must be the case, I believe. I 
cannot respond to others, or myself, from a prior conscious 
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state given that I am not conscious of a pre-conscious state. 
Having understood this, I came to question in my 
meditations whether or not the scholastic philosophical ideas 
that I inherited from my Western culture, in fact, did exist 
independently of my consciousness. I concluded that they 
did not. I came to the conclusion that I intentionally create 
them through an awareness of my relationships with the 
world around me.  
In my reflections I noted that I am able to distinguish 
between my being and my becoming, but I am not able to 
separate my being from my becoming. As well, I am 
conscious that my being and my becoming together 
constitute a simultaneous event, or moment, which leads me 
to conceive them as equi-primordial. I conceive, not 
perceive, them as such since I am not aware of my being, or 
my becoming, as somehow constructed outside of my 
conscious experience. Some philosophers suggest a logical 
priority of being over becoming but that is an arbitrary 
decision and I have no experience to support that such is, in 
fact, the case. I experience my being and my becoming as a 
unity within the present moment constituted by my 
relationships such that I experience no qualitative difference 
between the two. In my experience, a logical priority of 
being over becoming is an artificial and analytical mental 
construct that may or may not be actually true. A logical 
priority of being over becoming may, however, be a useful 
philosophical fiction. Therefore, for purposes of discussing 
with others the development of individual and collective 
meaning, I will continue to employ the understanding of a 
logical priority until further insight, or clarity, on the issue is 
given. I do experience, however, my becoming as a 
differentiation within my being wherein subjectivity, not 
subjectivism, is given the priority for meaningful 
interpretation. To my mind there are at least two sets of 
terms not to be confused within philosophy. The terms 
“subjectivity” and “objectivity,” are not to be confused with 
the terms “subjectivism” and “objectivism.” The former, are 
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phenomenological, that is, qualitative terms, whereas, the 
latter, are scholastic, that is, quantitative terms.  
In this presentation of the development of my 
philosophical understanding I depart from the traditional 
Western perspective, which follows Parmenides who 
believed in subordinating becoming to being. Following the 
view that subordinates becoming to being the Platonic and 
neo-platonic philosophers assigned real, but ideal, forms to 
what they held to be a higher realm of being. However, they 
did not assign any reality to the relationships among their 
ideal forms. They gave ideal forms considered materially, 
although they do not exist, a priority over relationships. This 
classical philosophical understanding is not consistent with 
my experience. Platonic, and some neo-platonic 
philosophers, continue to assign material forms to their 
sense experience, which they hold as belonging to a lower 
realm of being. This also, is not consistent with my 
experience. I see no reason to continue to hold to the 
existence of material forms. I adopt this position, or stance, 
since out of my experience, which is that my consciousness 
does not analyze being and subsequently discover a 
framework of material forms. Rather, I experience that my 
human consciousness recognizes being in relation to others, 
be they subjects or objects. In other words, I do not 
distinguish a hierarchy of classical forms. My experience is 
that my consciousness seeks essential principles within my 
self. That is, I differentiate between that which is “I” and 
that which is “not I.” I am aware of my conscious self, that 
is, “I,” as manifested through my body, yet as differing from 
my body. As a human being, I do not exist as a static entity 
separate from my body. I experience myself to be an 
incarnated entity in relationship to other bodies, be they 
incarnated or not. By incarnated I mean living or animated 
and possessing a soul (psyche). As a human incarnation, I 
exist in a certain way such that I relate myself to myself, 
consciously or unconsciously. As an incarnation, I 
experience my self as constituted by dynamic relationships 
and not merely as an ideal subject. Nor do I experience 
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myself as a dichotomized physical being, but as individuated 
reality capable of being present to others. I distinguish three 
unique existential moments of awareness in myself. These 
are the realization of my capacity for reflexive thinking, the 
realization of my individuality and the realization of my 
integrity. I am able to differentiate, but not separate, these 
three realizations within my conscious existence. Further, I 
continue to become increasingly aware of them as my 
understanding of their significance grows.  
Because of my relationships I am conscious that I exist 
not only for myself but also for that which is other than me. 
In fact, my experience is not confined to my incarnated, 
individuated being. Rather, in my existence I am holistically 
alive and my significance is derived from relationships 
within my environment. Being alive, I am, by constitution, 
greater than the sum of my individual parts. That is, I am 
holistically constituted. In my existential constitution I am 
able to refer me to myself through my capacity for reflection 
that results in differentiation. My construction of 
relationships arises from a conscious differentiation on my 
part and not from any a priori condition imposed from 
outside of my experience. Alternatively expressed, my re-
construction reflects my relational experience. It is a re-
construction from differentiation rather than a re-
construction from dichotomous being.  
It is within a relational experience that my self-
disclosure occurs. In this self-disclosure, I become aware of 
myself, as subject and as agent. I had no sense of my self as 
subject and as agent when I perceived myself as integrated, 
that is, as undifferentiated being. As I differentiate my self 
from my body I do so in the manner that every self does. 
The more I identify my self as subject and as agent the more 
I identify with every other subject and agent. Further, by 
constituting my self as a conscious, external, self-
manifestation of my incarnated and individuated being, that 
is, as I constitute my personality, I am able to place my self 
in an appropriate relationship with my environment, or 
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universe, of which I have become conscious and from which 
I am differentiated.  
I, as a self, do not have a structure as an object. In fact, I 
am devoid of structure when I consider my self as a self-
constituted subject. Structure is a mechanical concept, 
whereas, constitution is an organic concept. At each 
conscious moment in time, I consider my self, and ought to 
be considered by others, as constituted as a dynamic subject, 
not as a static object. I am alive when identifying my self as 
a subject to others, as well as a subject to my self. From this 
perspective, I am able to constitute an appropriate 
relationship with the environment, or universe, from which I 
have become consciously differentiated. Through this 
process of differentiation, I become conscious of an original 
existential stance and an original transcendental stance, 
which are co-terminus in and, constitutive of, my personal 
presence. In other words, I experience transcendence as 
immanence and vice versa. In this way I am integrally 
constituted within a unity of immanence and transcendence, 
which makes me what I am. But such integral constitution 
does not require an act of overcoming a dichotomy and 
returning to an original union. Such integral constitution is 
primal to my being. In my reflective experience, I am aware 
of no movement, act of apprehension or grasping on my part 
as an independent original being. My conscious activity, 
does not dis-integrate me from any primal being such that a 
separate entity is created. Initially, I experience no 
opposition between my incarnated and individuated self and 
the other, such that the other is hostile to me, be it a subject 
or object. However, as I live through moments of time, I do 
experience differentiation from other subjects or objects. 
Often what I find desirable is experienced, or brought to my 
consciousness, as that which satisfies a lack in my self. The 
phrase often quoted is: “I desire to be desired by the one I 
desire.” What I desire is perceived as apart from my self and 
has the potential to remain parted from my self. When this is 
the case I experience existential alienation. Then, to correct 
this, I consciously seek to conceive of others, subjects or 
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objects, in such a way that they exist in my conscious 
experience as co-operatively as possible and in such a way 
that I realize authentic relationships with them.  
Expanding upon the above reflection, I now present five 
phenomenological philosophical moments, or events. Each 
is a reflection upon a philosophical existential activity with 
an eye to the dehellenized future of my personal, but not 
private, belief. The events I reflect upon are: dehellenization 
and theological construction; dehellenization and becoming 
aware of God; dehellenization and believing; 
dehellenization and remembering and, dehellenization and 
watching and waiting.  
  
Dehellenization and Theological Construction  
  
These days I undertake theological construction from 
within a dehellenized understanding. Dehellenized 
understanding is not a fixed point of view but a point of 
view that is perpetually undergoing development and re-
constitution. The dehellenization process has helped me to 
realize that my Christian and secular experience had been 
for a time identical. I had no need to distinguish between 
them. It was easy, therefore, for me to think that to be a 
Christian was co-terminus with living in the secular Western 
social and cultural order. It took some time for me to truly 
appreciate that the secular Western social and cultural order 
is, in fact, the legacy of a Hellenized philosophical tradition. 
While reading the works of contemporary Western 
philosophers, I realized that this Hellenized philosophical 
inheritance was of serious concern to them. Their Hellenized 
philosophical inheritance appeared to be undergoing a 
critical process of assessment. However, upon critical 
examination of their thinking, I made my own discovery that 
some of them were merely engaged in up-dating traditional 
ideas and not engaged in a process of dehellenization at all. 
Realizing that I ceased to follow their lead, I rejected the 
mere updating of ideas and sought instead a replacement, 
that is, a truly dehellenized approach to philosophical 
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contemplation. Encouraged by the Catholic philosophical 
language at the time of Vatican II, I favor a ressourcement 
over an aggiornamento. That is, a return to the sources of 
philosophical language over a mere updating of 
philosophical language, designed to conform to modern 
usage, is to be preferred. In light of Vatican II, I asked what 
we as philosophers and theologians entering the end of a 
philosophical age was to be our role in constituting any new 
understanding between Christian and secular experience. 
The answer, I realized, was that only a return to the sources 
of Western philosophical thinking could provide a 
satisfactory direction for the way ahead.  
One effect of this philosophical crisis, that is, the option 
between aggiornamento and ressourcement, upon me was 
that I could not know of it without becoming a different 
person. The knowledge of it transformed me and that 
required a philosophical readjustment on my part. As time 
went on I found this philosophical readjustment to be 
perpetual. Further, I found it necessary to do something 
about this readjustment and investigate its historical sources 
and, also to do something about my self, that is, consider 
and construct the future of my belief. The cultural and social 
context in which I live, that is, my environment changes on 
the basis of the collective experiences of my community. In 
the contemporary Western context, I have experienced such 
change occurring slowly. As a result, I discovered that I am 
among those contemporary Christians calling for change, 
yet not taken seriously by many of my contemporaries. Or, 
if I am taken seriously, I am not heeded, because of their 
philosophical disinterest, which is due to a commitment to 
their a priori belief system retained from a Hellenized 
philosophical past. Ahead of some of my peers, I soon 
realized that when answers to my philosophical questions 
are given beforehand there is no need for me to actively 
undertake any theological construction. I could remain 
philosophically passive receiving pre-existing ideas 
uncritically. I realized also that rather than blame my social 
or intellectual inheritance constructed on an a priori 
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philosophical understanding I needed to face my own 
responsibility and become an agent for change within 
myself and within my environment. Thus, my problem 
became not just how to correct my past but, more 
significantly, how to plan for my future free from a 
Hellenized philosophy. Only through a methodology, not 
dependent on a Hellenized inheritance, but constituted 
phenomenologically could I plan for a future that did not 
duplicate my earlier beliefs.  
Through phenomenologically reflecting upon my 
experience, I have come to understand that Christianity is 
neither an abstraction, nor an idea. Nor is it an ideology. I 
have abandoned this understanding. These days I express the 
essence of my Christian belief phenomenologically through 
relationships within the existential reality of my community 
of faith. The faith community in which I live possesses a 
historical reality not only in the psychological, social, and 
natural sense, but also in the transcendent, spiritual, and 
supernatural sense. I must explain this. To believe in the 
Judeo-Christian revelation given to my community is to 
believe that my existence is constituted by certain events 
involving God’s activity. Even though I am conscious of 
God’s activity, immanently and transcendentally, in my 
experience of being and becoming, what I have found more 
significant, however, is that the original revelation in all 
these events might have been otherwise than they were. I 
admit that I was not aware of the implications of the insight, 
that original revelation could possibly have been otherwise 
than what it was, until I was exposed to Leslie Dewart’s 
thinking on the same subject.  
At this stage of my philosophical development I had not 
yet managed to formulate a totally satisfactory approach to 
the integration of Hellenic philosophical concepts into my 
experience. I think that part of the reason for my lack of 
success was due to the fact that Hellenic concepts were not 
merely unsatisfactory in interpreting my experience, but also 
they were foreign to my experience. In other words, my 
experience is not Hellenic. The fact is that the philosophical 
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and theological questions raised within my ordinary 
experience have little in common with Hellenic 
philosophical understanding which characterizes an age that 
no longer exists. Eventually, I recognized that I needed an 
alternative approach. The question became, in my Christian 
philosophical understanding, a question of interpreting, in 
satisfactory and contemporary concepts, my daily 
experience in the presence of God. The question of 
satisfactory and contemporary concepts is an existential, not 
theoretical, question. As I contemplated this new insight it 
did yield some satisfactory results. One was that the 
inordinate influence of Hellenic philosophy, particularly on 
early the twelfth century thought and subsequently on my 
Christian understanding, was no longer dominant.  
In my earlier years I had assumed that society and 
history, as ideologies, were somehow determined by pre-
existing ideas. Today, however, my philosophical 
contemplation has helped me to realize that society and 
history, as humanly constituted, are as indeterminable in 
their constitution as are the persons who make up a society 
and write its history. Society and history are not fixed 
ideologies, but are dynamic human social constructions. It is 
through a dehellenized and phenomenological understanding 
that I am able to understand society and history as 
indeterminable to the same degree that humans are 
indeterminable. This understanding frees me from the 
necessity of accepting that pre-existing ideas determine my 
conduct. I do recognize, however, that certain existential 
constraints determine my choices but necessity is not one of 
them. Thus, even given the limiting conditions of my 
environment, I have the power to make it other than it is.  
If my theological construction in practical human affairs 
has any meaning and Christian value for me and my 
community, it is because I am trying to work out our proper 
relationships in order to live in responsible freedom. To live 
in responsible freedom is the freedom for which I have been 
created. Further, in that freedom, I believe that I am to live 
in a philosophically contemplative manner, that is, to 
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respond freely to the supernatural vocation to which God 
calls me. I try to respond creatively and faithfully, as an 
individual within the contemporary Western social order and 
culture, but in a dehellenized manner. I have noticed that 
when the Hellenic philosophers attempted in their social 
order and culture something similar they presupposed that 
philosophical ideas with independent existence composed 
reality because they accepted that cosmic events depended 
upon the necessity of fate. On the contrary, I am a believer, 
not in fate but human freedom. Cosmic events do not 
depend on fate. When, in human freedom, I contemplate 
about what I should do if I were to do the right thing in 
creating my future, I contemplate about what I have to do to 
bring into existence what does not yet exist or is not yet 
present in my conscious experience. Having experienced 
such freedom, I hold that the contemplative life, as a way of 
being, is primary and preferable to a life of mere cognition.  
As a free a morally good social life and a peaceful world 
are possible for me because such problems of conduct, or 
ethics, arise out of my consciousness and subjectivity rather 
than out of any theoretical, objective, or ideological struggle 
with society or with other individuals. As a free agent I am 
able to contemplate philosophical issues before acting on 
them. Thus, I am truly responsible for my conduct. No one 
else is. There is no group, or individual, that can do away 
with my moral freedom. Only I can do that. But, in 
abdicating my moral freedom I would become 
dehumanized. My present moral decisions arise out of my 
prior humanitarian freedom. I cannot avoid ruling myself 
reasonably, humanely, and autonomously. From a moral 
perspective, I do not do as Plato and Aristotle did, that is, 
attempt to conform to a preconceived order to reality. In 
short, through my philosophical contemplation I have come 
to realize that I theologically construct my future of belief as 






Dehellenization and Becoming Aware of God  
 
I understand my experience of God at my present level 
of awareness reached by a developing maturity in my 
thinking. Ultimately, because of my acceptance of the 
dehellenization of philosophical contemplation, I must now 
live with an awareness of the divergent notions of the God 
of Christian belief. Further, the divergent notions of the God 
of Christian belief suggest to me alternative methodologies 
for understanding. One such alternative has been to 
understand, from a subjective point of view, that my self-
fulfillment as a human being is intrinsically connected to my 
self-realization. What I make myself to be, as a knowing 
subject, places me in an essential relation to God. 
Purposiveness, which I distinguish from purpose, is my 
existential role as determined intentionally and subjectively. 
Purposiveness constitutes my internal seeking creatively to 
be. On the other hand, purpose is my goal in life as 
determined externally and objectively. I do not seek, as a 
purpose for being, the classical Hellenic philosophical goal 
of happiness. Rather, I seek purposively to be creative and 
thus becoming fulfilled in God’s presence. Thus, in my self-
constitution I seek to be in the presence of God creatively 
with God’s self-communication to me.  
Among the first beliefs that I recall rejecting in the 
evolution of my philosophical contemplation was the 
illusion that the illusion does not exist. That is, the illusion 
that reality must be conceived as being, or reality is not 
conceivable at all, I have rejected. Having rejected the 
notion that reality is restricted to being, I no longer needed 
to equate, as the Hellenists did, intelligibility and necessity. 
Intelligibility and necessity are predicates or attributes of the 
Hellenic concept of being, not of reality. My belief in the 
evolution of being and becoming, conceived as presence 
within reality, precludes equating intelligibility and 
necessity. For intelligibility and necessity to be equated 
requires the adoption of a non-evolutionary Hellenic 
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philosophical idealistic perspective. I have found this 
perspective to be incompatible with my experience.  
The reconciliation of my belief in God, within my 
everyday experience, requires the dehellenization of 
Christian dogmatic and doctrinal concepts. Dehellenization 
includes the process of my self-conscious rejection of a 
philosophical point of view, no longer valid, which had been 
formally realized within the culture I inherited. Such 
rejection is required in order to permit a new methodology, 
that is, an authentic scientific, but not technological, 
methodology for philosophical contemplation within a 
phenomenological point of view. In other words, 
dehellenization is an activity of my self-conscious creation 
of the future of my belief through rejection of a present 
unsatisfactory inheritance and the subsequent acceptance of 
an authentic scientific replacement. Phenomenology is that 
authentic scientific replacement as introduced by Edmund 
Husserl. Of Husserl’s phenomenology as scientific, Quentin 
Lauer writes: “It is a ‘science’ because it affords a 
knowledge that has effectively disposed of all the elements 
that could render its grasp ‘contingent’.” 29 My conscious 
creation of belief takes place within my community, which 
presumably is striving for a common self-conscious creation 
of the future of belief. Within my community my experience 
is that I live in an environment that has been created by a 
multitude of persons. Hence, characterized by a pluralist 
interpretation of experience, I encounter unity, not 
uniformity, in my community. Even though I cannot stop the 
future pluralist development of my environment, I can be 
involved in its transformation as it is taking place. Such 
transformation, in fact, impinges upon my consciousness 
and compels me to re-think my self-constituted life. This re-
thinking is a perpetual process. As a result, growth in my 
Christian theism is self-consciously perpetual, its traditional 
form being replaced by a contemporary form appropriate to 
my experience and my culture. Thus, any experience of my 
awareness and cultural interpretation, as come of age, is also 
an experience of God come of age.  
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As a theist I consciously live out of the essence, but not 
necessarily out of the existence, of my faith. That is, 
orthodox belief, rather than tradition, constitutes my life. 
However, this conscious living out of the essence of my 
faith requires an existential response to a transcendence 
revealed within my consciousness through a process of 
differentiation. As a result of this process of differentiation I 
cannot believe in God once and for all any more than I can 
exist once and for all. Both are a perpetual process. Nor, 
without being idolatrous, can I now believe in anything, or 
anyone else, in the same way in which I believe in God. 
Interestingly, it was only later in my contemplative 
philosophical life that I became aware that Christianity is the 
only religion to generate an attitude of atheism.  
My self-awareness occurs within the experience of my 
particular religion, that is, the Christian religion. My self-
awareness is a property of my human nature. I am aware 
that I have a personal history, which distinguishes me from 
other living creatures and their personal histories. Various 
philosophical traditions from early Hellenic times to modern 
times have suggested that humans are merely thinking 
animals. Yet, I find that in my understanding I exhibit a 
peculiar and unique ability that not all other living creatures, 
that is, animals, necessarily share. Further, I am a being who 
is capable of understanding myself to be present to myself. 
Being present to myself is my consciousness. The real 
difference between other conscious animals and me is not 
that I possess a higher degree of knowledge. The real 
difference between other animals and me is that I am able to 
act self-reflectively in a humanitarian manner.  
My human development, in a philosophical sense, takes 
the form of an increase in awareness. This increase in 
awareness is a basic characteristic that ultimately reveals my 
capacity for transcendence. What is unique and distinctive 
about my transcendental development, when compared to 
my temporal development, is that my transcendental 
development takes the form of a qualitative, as opposed to 
quantitative, experience. Yet, I recognize my existential 
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development as occurring within a quantitative temporal 
experience. That is, an experience in time. My 
transcendental awareness develops qualitatively, that is, 
essentially, as I become aware of that which I am, in some 
manner, already conscious. In fact, transcendental awareness 
is an awareness of reality outside time. In heightening my 
transcendental awareness, I render concrete that which had 
been present to me all the time and which I now recognize 
in a new light. Thus, through transcendental awareness I see 
a sharper, clearer, and nobler meaning. Such a meaning is 
essential meaning. This new essential meaning of which I 
have become conscious is not of another independent 
meaning of which I am now conscious. Rather, this new 
essential meaning has emerged from, or evolved out of, the 
earlier meaning that I had incorporated into my life. This 
new essential meaning is now an expanded experience of the 
present. Thus, in heightening my awareness, I realize a 
nobler transcendental consciousness, which in turn, creates a 
further genuine development in my consciousness. In short, 
I experience my present transcendental consciousness as 
evolving in relation to my experience and being meaningful 
only in relation to my experience.  
My experience, common in Western traditional 
understanding, has been that to know a thing better means to 
know more about the same thing. That is, knowledge has 
been conceived quantitatively, not qualitatively. This 
understanding became problematic when I understood that 
the closing of revelation, after the end of the New Testament 
era, meant that my Christian faith could not reach any new 
truths. The catechism teaches that the Trinity and 
Incarnation were revealed within the Christian faith in 
relation to Judaism. Thus, once I perceived my Christian 
faith as complete I realized that it could only increase 
through the multiplication of concepts about the faith that I 
already knew. However, this understanding did not reflect 
my experience. I did not experience God’s self-revelation in 
Jesus as nothing but a variation of a closed theme within 
revelation. I have no experience of being restricted to 
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knowing only the historical record of a revelation that 
occurred in the past and that has been completed in the past. 
Rather, I experience living in an open-ended revealing 
presence of God whose transcendental presence is made 
concrete in my daily Christian life.   
I am not satisfied, philosophically, with any conscious 
attempts at reunion with some form of being from which I 
was originally separated. However, I am satisfied with my 
conscious and continual attempts at self-differentiation out 
of that being with which I am originally continuous and with 
whom I share unity, but not union. My self-differentiation 
out of that being is an active process whereby my unique 
identity emerges and is present to others as well as myself. 
Thus, my identity is not the becoming of my being. Rather, 
my identity constitutes my being and becoming 
simultaneously and abides in time and is distinguishable 
from others within time. In other words, I conceive my 
identity as the differentiation, within my consciousness, of 
my being from other beings. In this conscious 
differentiation, I experience no true difference between my 
identity and self-identity since they are co-temporal with my 
self-conscious awareness.  
I understand truth not to result from my efforts at 
representation of an object. Rather, I understand truth as the 
moral value of my relationships when relating existentially 
to others as subjects or objects. Truth is that moral value that 
emerges from the differentiation process of my self-
constitution and my coming-into-unique-being. Unlike the 
Hellenic conception, truth, as a phenomenological moral 
value, can only be expressed as fidelity within relationships. 
Thus, in the phenomenological and essential approach that I 
have adopted truth cannot be expressed as conformity within 
my relationships. Conformity in relationships is the classical 
stance that I have rejected. That stance would require me to 
relate to others by reason of their nature, objectively 
understood. That is, I would have to conform to others due 
to external norms. Fidelity, on the other hand, requires me to 
relate to others by reason of my own nature, subjectively 
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understood. In being faithful within my relationships I 
become what I am for others due to internal norms. As 
Shakespeare put it, “To thine own self be true.” 30 In short, 
conformity, like law, obligates from the outside, or without. 
Fidelity, like nobility, obliges from the inside, or within.  
I have accepted as historically accurate that 
Hellenization of Christianity was a gradual transformation 
of earlier cultural forms into later ones. Hellenism is not the 
cultural form of the world today. It was, however, the 
cultural form of the ecumenical world of the apostolic and 
patristic ages. Throughout the apostolic and patristic ages, it 
was practically impossible to distinguish between the 
universalization and the Hellenization of Christianity. In the 
Hellenist philosophical view God is a transcendent being, 
vis à vis others, in contrast to the Hebraic philosophical 
view in which God is a presence to one among others. 
Within my phenomenological understanding, God is that 
reality, other than being, who is present to being. Further, 
God is that reality that makes my being “to be.” Thus, my 
unique life is a differentiated, or individuated, coming-into-
being being manifested in relation to God, who is present to 
me.  
I have come to realize that I am, as a self-identified 
subject, a center of consciousness. Without being guilty of 
objectivism, I am an entity who can objectify my self. I am 
that which can objectively signify my self to my self. In the 
early stages of my personal philosophical development, due 
to the influence of a modified Greek metaphysical thinking, 
I had accepted that there was a concrete separation or 
dichotomy between essence and existence. I have now 
accepted another understanding, based on my experience, 
which does not accord with that Hellenistic understanding.  
As an existential thinker, my belief bears directly upon 
the experience of the reality God and not upon words or 
upon concepts about God. God is immediately revealed. 
That is to say, I apprehend God’s revelation directly. My 
experience is that my consciousness bears directly upon the 
realty of God. Thus, my knowledge of God does not result 
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in a perceptual union of me, as a subjective knower, and the 
object that I know, that is, God. Rather, my knowledge of 
God is constituted through my differentiation and 
individuation within that reality, God. Hence, I do not 
experience God in terms of an essence within existence. 
Rather, I experience God through a differentiation within 
reality, as a process of emerging individuation, both 
transcendent and immanent, beyond being and existence 
with no predetermined history. Since differentiation is a 
phenomenologically conceived process in which my 
existence means that, in order for me to be, I must 
consciously create my self, that is, differentiate my self 
within God’s reality.  
I concur with the existentialist philosophers Gabriel 
Marcel and Nicolas Berdyaev and do not conceive my being 
as polarized into existence and essence. My existence and 
essence are co-terminus with, but differentiated from, my 
real presence which is a phenomenological, not ideological, 
presence. I reject any a priori philosophical understanding 
that posits a dichotomy between essence and existence in 
constituting my individuated existence. Since I accept that 
things need not exist necessarily; they could be other than 
what they presently are. Also, I accept that to exist and to be 
present are different understandings. Reality, which is 
beyond the physical, is revealed to me as present within the 
process of my differentiation. In fact, there is, beyond the 
physical, present to me a reality of which I am conscious, 
that when felt by me, constitutes me more fully than I would 
be, were I not exposed to its influence. I experience my 
constitution as true holistic consciousness. I am conscious 
that I am more than the sum of my parts. A holistic 
consciousness does not burden me with having to prove that 
there is actually a God. Rather, in my contemplative 
philosophy, I am concerned with disclosing how the reality 
of God is present to my consciousness. My concern is the 
presence and reality of God, not God’s existence. In a 
holistic conscious experience what is revealed to me, since it 
is not obvious, is God’s presence, not God’s existence. 
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Further, this real presence of God is not that of Greek 
metaphysics.  
My self, my individuated personality, is that which is 
conscious; is that which can signify my self to my self. For 
me to be a subject, that is a person, is to be known to myself 
in God’s presence. My personality is a manifestation of my 
unique self at my present stage of development. Further, my 
consciousness is what constitutes my humanity. I experience 
my self as an entity who desires to go beyond its existential 
self. If I, as a Christian, look at the world and understand 
nature through Hellenic eyes, I will find it necessary to 
assert the omnipotence of God over and against me. On the 
contrary, I am conscious that God does not have power over 
me in that sense.  
I am conscious, as well, that the fundamental 
relationship that exists between my self and God renders us 
present to each other in the act of constituting the world, that 
is, our environment, our communion. This, I believe, is true 
insight for all human subjects.  
In my daily life, as I dehellenize my Christian belief, I 
recast the meaning of faith in terms that do not imply God’s 
ascendancy over me. With the acceptance of Hellenic 
philosophy, I had accepted a spilt within the previously 
unified relationship of God and me. In accepting Hellenistic 
philosophy, I had perceived being, as logically prior to 
becoming. In my current dehellenized life the perception of 
a supernatural, transcendental being is not an intrinsic part 
of my Christian faith. What is now absolutely fundamental 
to my Christian faith is the consciousness of God’s 
immanent grace, that is, God’s presence in me as a true gift 
(donum) of God.  
As contemporary Western philosophy departs more and 
more from its Hellenic presuppositions, the concept of 
classical supernaturalism loses its usefulness for my 
Christian belief. I experience this loss on a daily basis. 
However, to this day, the mainstream of Catholic 
philosophy has remained scholastic and hence somewhat 
unsympathetic to my contemporary understanding of a new 
55 
 
humanity. In the alternative view to scholasticism, which I 
have come to accept, grace is not opposed to my human 
nature but my human nature receives grace because that is 
how I, as human, have been constituted. In my human nature 
I am existentially, not metaphysically, related to grace. In 
short, grace is my existential awareness of the reality of 
God’s presence to me.  
  
Dehellenization and Believing  
 
Concerning belief, the question that I have asked myself 
is: Do I consciously undertake to critically construct the 
future of my personal belief, or do I choose to remain 
satisfied with my pre-critical understanding? This is the 
question I now address. Today, in my present philosophical 
contemplation I consider issues from a meta-metaphysical 
perspective. That is, having rejected traditional Hellenistic 
understanding in preference to a phenomenological 
philosophical understanding, I have transcended the merely 
metaphysical in my contemplation. In a phenomenological 
philosophical understanding, the real problem becomes not 
whether the world will change or whether it will remain the 
same. The real problem is whether the world will change of 
its own accord, without my participation, or whether it will 
be changed deliberately, consciously and with my 
participation.  
I contemplate what has presented itself as knowledge to 
my consciousness in phenomenal existential relationships. 
These are phenomenological existential relationships which 
define the limits of my philosophical consciousness in 
relation to reality. Further, actualized knowledge, or my 
Christian belief, lies beyond the foundations of a Hellenized 
Hebraism. Nor does it lie in a pre-Hellenized Hebraism.  
While there is no possibility to return to the past, the 
shaping of my future of belief does require an analysis of the 
past without re-living it. In analyzing the past I am 
conscious of myself, not as having been a static being, but as 
having been an active free agent in the presence of other 
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active free agents and God, who also is a free agent. In 
constructing the future of my Christian belief I have not 
chosen a traditional philosophical basis, nor any foundation 
provided by an up-dated traditional understanding. Rather, I 
have chosen to look to the future and actualize my self in the 
present as an agent effecting change.  
In my philosophical musings I have made the same 
discovery as philosophers before me. That is, I discovered 
the activity of relating my self to reality and, that my 
relation to reality is a self-relation. It was only after I had 
learned to define myself in terms of consciousness that I 
came to appreciate the logic of the process by which I had 
become conscious of this self-relation. The proper 
philosophical relation to reality is that of contemplation as 
Plato and Aristotle recognized. To be conscious of reality is 
not to interact with it as if it were one of many objects. 
Reality is not susceptible to objectification in itself. To 
assume that every entity is objectively constituted as a self-
contained necessity is to reject the possibility of dynamic 
activity and remain within a static Hellenist mind-set. 
Rather, to be conscious of reality is to behold it, to reflect 
upon it inwardly and to recognize it as it is in itself, that is, 
in its essence. I know reality not through conversing with it, 
nor by engaging it on a not-me basis as it follows its own 
necessary course. But, I am conscious of reality through 
various phenomena present to me.  
Classical epistemological thought begins with the 
dichotomous juxtaposition of self and non-self, subject and 
object, mind and being. In classical thought, the mind itself 
belongs to the category of being. In my earliest 
contemplation, I believed that my mind and my being 
confront each other as I distinguished one from the other. 
My experience was that in being aware of the other I 
overcame its otherness. I comprehended the other despite its 
separation from me and was truly conscious of it. The 
overcoming of this separation is what I had traditionally 
accepted as knowledge. To know was, therefore, for my 
mind to pass from separation to a type of union with the 
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other. According to St Thomas’s explanation such union 
takes place within the knower such that a cognitive power 
brings about the unification of the knower to the known. But 
this is not so in all cases. That is, the two do not become 
one, or unified, with the exception that when the known, 
itself, is a knower. 31 The question arises, then, whether the 
cause of this assumed unification of the knower and known 
refers to something in the knowing subject or something in 
the being that is known. 32 This describes the dichotomous 
approach that I have rejected.  
I hold knowledge not to be constituted by the classical 
overcoming of a dichotomy, but to be constituted by a 
relational fidelity of the knower to the known. Insofar as I 
know another subject, I am the known. Thus, the unity 
affected by my knowledge is not a joining of two parts; it is 
not a union, but a relational unification, constituted in the 
relationship between the knower, that is me, and the known, 
that is, the other. In actualizing, or recognizing this unity 
through the process of differentiation, I have the benefit of 
language, not just mere communication, to express my 
experience. To my mind, language is a function of 
actualization rather than the signification of what has been 
actualized.  
To the degree that I do anything unconsciously, I do it 
uncritically, and to the degree I do anything uncritically, I 
impede my freedom by restricting the possibilities of belief 
that could open to me in the future. Dehellenization permits 
my future conscious creation of the possibilities of belief in 
a world, which does not yet exist, based on the experience of 
the one that does exist. In short, my new world of belief 
arises from within my old world, not from a location outside 
of my old world. In my understanding, then, when I create a 
new world it is tantamount to transcending the past old 
world. As a general rule, the culture in which I live is 
abandoning the religion that brought it into being. Thus, as a 
religious person, I experience that I am often estranged from 
the religion I inherited. However, I have found it useful 
understand how this estrangement occurred so that I may 
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overcome it effects. In undertaking a phenomenological 
approach to understanding I have reached a level of self-
consciousness and self-creativity that views existential 
dichotomy as a philosophical error not to be repeated in the 
conscious creation of the future of my belief.  
My consciousness is self-presentative. That is, it 
presents my self both to the world of being and, it presents 
my self to my self as part of the world of becoming. My 
consciousness being continually heightened differentiates 
and abstracts within the world of becoming in which I grow 
as a person. My consciousness is also heightened as it 
differentiates my self from that which is not my self. I am a 
self whose subjectivity is disclosed when I differentiate my 
self from others. Thus, I am among those entities, which 
come into being, and among those entities whose existence 
emerges through self-differentiation. In this self-
differentiation I am contingent because I make myself to be 
in my context, that is, I create myself. The ultimate 
achievement of my consciousness is my self-possession. I 
have meaning, as a becoming being, as relative to myself. 
Further, I do not make my self out of a void. I experience 
pre-determined categories from which I create my meaning 
whether such categories are pre-determined by the nature of 
the mind, as Kant thought, or by the nature of being, as the 
pre-Kantian philosophers thought. The truth or error of my 
understanding depends on the relationship between me, as 
subject, and the other, as object, and not on the correct 
apprehension of the object by me as a knowing subject. I do 
not find solutions to my existential dilemmas in past 
philosophies but, rather, in a present phenomenological 
awareness influenced by the nature of my mind.  
When I assert my existence, it is not merely as an 
affirmation of a unique and isolated individual. When I 
assert my existence, it is the proof of the contingency of my 
being. That is, my existence is a contingency dependent on a 
community and God, or better, God’s revelation to my 
community. The dehellenization of my Christian belief does 
not mean the rejection of my previous Hellenic philosophy 
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the substitution of another more appropriate philosophy of 
contingency. The term dehellenization is not simply a 
negative, that is, it is not un-hellenization, but 
dehellenization. In strictly positive terms I experience 
dehellenization as the conscious creation of the future of my 
belief. Arising from my experience there are three points to 
be understood in the conscious creation of the future of my 
belief. The first is that knowledge cannot be made 
purposeful. 33  
Dare I say that evolution and purposiveness constitute 
the historical development of my thinking? Within my 
intellectual history I have come to understand that the task 
to which philosophy calls me is not the dismantling and 
reconstruction of metaphysics, but rather the transcending of 
metaphysics. Further, my task is not only that of 
transcending specific Hellenistic metaphysics. Hellenistic 
metaphysics is but one form of metaphysical philosophy to 
be transcended. My task is, in fact, the transcending of all 
metaphysics in order to encounter reality. That includes the 
transcending of any phenomenological ontology as well. In 
my current philosophical contemplation, I am at a new stage 
of dehellenization, that is, a non-Hellenistic, but essential, 
scientific stage.  
It is understandable that St Thomas thought that the 
scholastic way of thinking was the only methodological way 
of thinking given his context. However, I am conscious of 
the fact that there is no necessary methodology for me to 
relate myself to reality; as well, that no methodology of 
relating to reality is natural or privileged. My world is now 
one of increasing personal responsibility and my problem is 
one of finding an appropriate intellectual and philosophical 
methodology through which I may respond to the meanings 
arising out of my experience of both the old and new 
worlds. A phenomenological methodology has the 
advantage that it incorporates my entire person through my 
senses, emotions, intellect, and will in the act of knowing. 
As a consequence, I am conscious that my contingent 
human experience is insufficient. I may overcome this 
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insufficiency, however, via a conscious holistic 
understanding. When I incorporate my conscious holistic 
experience as an act of faith this equates to nothing less than 
my quest for meaning. It is my faith that seeks 
understanding.  
But the problem for me, in light of the future, is that it is 
not easy to give a concrete shape to the final project of my 
life. Since I live in community, must I suppose that the 
concrete form of my project be the same for every one? The 
answer is no. Although I am conscious that there is in my 
life a creative freedom, which is itself subject to 
development throughout my life; I must not presume that 
this is the same for other human subjects. They will have 
their unique experience and outcome of their creative 
freedom. In my present understanding, I realize that the 
outcome of my freedom is not as definable from the 
beginning as I once thought. Nor is it predetermined. I 
consciously and freely create the future of my belief in the 
context of theological faith, hope and love contemplated 
holistically.  
  
Dehellenization and Remembering  
 
Western Christianity has historically relied upon 
Hellenistic metaphysics in forming a philosophical 
understanding of the nature and attributes of God. However, 
this is changing. Human evolution has deeply influenced 
religion in general and belief in God in particular. Generally, 
I find that I am first conscious of what I do to nature before I 
am conscious of what nature does to me. The capacity to be 
conscious of what nature is doing to me is a capacity that 
comes with maturity. Thus, I need to create a philosophy 
that will be suitable to my increasingly mature theological 
activity in giving proper expression to my understanding of 
God’s influence upon me as a subject. My religious crisis, 
then, has to do with the epistemological and metaphysical 
questions, which underlie my Christian theology and belief. 
In short, my religious crisis is philosophical.  
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I have remarked earlier that I use language to express 
what I have understood in my mind. From that 
understanding arises my philosophical need for education 
rather than information. Such education requires a re-
conceptualized understanding of the relationship to my 
community and the world as I experience them. I need to re-
conceptualize myself, my place in my community and in the 
world. Since reality is disclosed within the mind that 
apprehends it, my mind is simultaneously a constituent of 
any reality that I can know. In this process of re-
conceptualization, or education, strictly speaking what I am 
conscious of are not phenomena that manifest themselves, 
but the essence of reality, which manifests itself 
phenomenologically.  
Being conscious of the essence of reality does not 
construct a dichotomy between my thought and speech. And 
yet any dichotomy that I do recognize, or remember from 
my previous contemplation, is a fictional dichotomy. I am 
conscious that in expressing my relationship to reality I use 
language as a personal, but not private, creation of my 
understanding. When I think or talk about the world, that is, 
my environment, I create an essential relationship to it. In 
this relationship I do not merely relate to the world, or my 
environment, but I self-relate, to the world and my 
environment. In my thinking I become related to the world, 
or my environment, as a self, that is, as a subject that is not 
only related to the world but knows of its relations to the 
world. This is dehellenized remembering, which is a 
perpetual activity that I undertake.  
What I achieve in my language and thought is the 
creation of my self in relation to my environment. The 
activity I undertake has happened and is happening to me. In 
other words, I need to abide by my experience recollection 
of which resides in my conscious memory. This, however, 
does not mean that I extract truth from my experience and 
present it through a process of a mental duplication. Even 
though the essential insight may be the same for every 
philosopher the remembering is not necessarily the same for 
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all philosophers. Remembering is that quality of education 
which accounts for the fact that the more I actually know the 
more I potentially know. Thus, when I remember I enlarge 
the horizon of my consciousness. That means that were I to 
insist upon any pre-given conceptual and cultural form of 
religious remembering it would prevent the enlargement of 
my conscious horizon. This would be prejudicial to me since 
this pre-given form of religious remembering would then 
obscure the meaning, which it once revealed. My personal 
and individuated meaning is not to be found in the 
remembering of my experience, but rather, is to be found in 
my conscious interpretation of my experience. Thus, in my 
conscious interpretation I employ language to create my 
selfhood as well as illustrate the world’s and my 
environment’s objectivity.  
My experience is that my memory is not the objective 
recollection or duplication of my previous experience 
because my previous experience was not necessary, but 
contingent. Phenomenological recollection, or apperception, 
is a subjective activity. Recollection, as objective memory, 
is the approach characteristic of Hellenist thinking. That is 
to say, recollection as objective memory, results from an 
inner constitutive principle of experience that is intelligible 
independently of me as subject. Phenomenologically, 
intelligibility, or the inner constitutive principle, is to be 
found in my relations to things, not in the things themselves. 
This means that my intelligibility, my inner constitutive 
principle, is not to be found in my individual substance, but 
in my temporal and historical presence reflected in the 
relationships by which I live out of the past in light of the 
future. Through my relationships I am emerging from the 
world of being in which I presently exist. By virtue of my 
consciousness I differentiate myself from the world of 
objective being. I cannot be an entity who is nothing but an 
object, even if I am an object who thinks. I am a subject and 
as subject, I am what an object never is, that is, conscious. 
In my emergence into the future I situate my self in my new 
world and create my self within my relations to reality. My 
63 
 
relationships within reality are constituted by my self-
creative activity in which I differentiate my self from a 
world of objects from which I was originally indistinct.  
My mind, or consciousness, perpetually develops. One 
of the consequences of this development is the heightening 
awareness of my conscious understanding. When I accept 
that revelation is a communication to me, or others, that 
acceptance implies that my consciousness is essentially 
involved in it. My language interpreting revelation is human 
even though the truth of revelation may be beyond me. Even 
so revelation is, I hold, proper to me and other human 
subjects due to our capacity for language. I have no reason 
to believe in a brute animal equivalent of revelation or 
human language. I have come to the conclusion that my 
language must be recast in order to make allowance for my 
greater awareness of my own consciousness. Since my 
consciousness is a means of communication of my self to 
my self and, since my capacity for consciousness has 
increased, I am able to participate more consciously and 
deliberately in my own self-fashioning today than in the 
past.  
I understand my faith as a self-disposition, which 
renders my experience meaningful and worthwhile. Thus, 
my Christian faith is able to support religious meaning and 
value within a variety of alternative forms of understanding. 
My problem is not how to defend the traditional concept of 
God in my secular experience but how to take advantage of 
the growth in my understanding in order to create the most 
satisfactory form of interpretation of God. Thus, I cannot 
remain within a Hellenist understanding with respect to my 
belief in God. As I have mentioned, to the Hellenist mind 
necessity is an intrinsic characteristic of the cosmos as 
whole. The Hellenist future, therefore, which included the 
gods, is nothing but a remembered ideal past.  
I exist as a member of humanity. And humanity is more 
than the numerical totality of individuals existing on the 
surface of the earth. Humanity, as a holistic concept, is also 
the historical reality of generations having succeeded 
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generations. Given my human freedom, my creation of a 
future life-style may well take place without, and possibly 
against, God. In my temporal existence I can create the sort 
of life-style in which there is no room for God and, as well, 
dispense with a morality that normally would transcend me. 
I know that unlike the Hellenist gods, the Hebrew God, 
Yahweh, did not only create nature but is also present to 
nature. The Hebraic Kingdom of God, or heaven, not the 
Hellenist one, is the outcome of history when history is co-
created by Yahweh and me, and like-minded believers. I, as 
a member of humanity, have the capacity for moral choice. 
My moral choice is not restricted to the equitable disposition 
of material goods. My moral choices are not merely ethical 
choices. Thus, a proper question is whether it is morally 
permissible for me to change the world, remembering its 
history as a co-created past, in such a way that moral 
dilemmas of the past do not arise in the future.  
  
Dehellenization and Watching and Waiting  
 
Very few of the observations and concepts I am 
contemplating in this investigation are original. The fact is 
that most are not even new. What I am trying to accomplish 
here is the sort of task that philosophers have always 
undertaken. That is, to begin to arrange my ideas into a 
single and insightful mosaic of a personal, but not private, 
comprehensive and unconventional synthesis. My 
philosophic explanation of this synthesis is dependent on the 
stimulus of some sort that either influenced my 
consciousness from within or from without. In response to 
this stimulus I have acted internally and have acted to create 
a new form of consciousness. In short, I have rejected what I 
experienced to be an inadequate scholastic philosophy and 
have constituted, in its place, a new scientific methodology 
for the creation of the future of my belief.  
By virtue of my historical memory, that is, my “that was 
then; this is now” consciousness, I possess an evolutionary 
understanding of the world that was not available to the 
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Hellenists. However, there is nothing in this evolutionary 
understanding of mine that restricts its usefulness to 
philosophy. This evolutionary understanding is a defining 
characteristic of my life. I re-create myself by adjusting to 
my environment through a phenomenological philosophy 
that depends upon scientific understanding. It is 
characteristic of brute animal life that adjustment by the 
creature to its world is mediated through its senses. Unlike 
the brute animal, however, I adjust by relating myself to a 
world that I perceive essentially real. As well, I relate to 
myself, whom I perceive to be an essentially real self. 
Further, I relate to other such selves, whom I perceive as 
beings who are in the process of becoming and who 
perceive themselves as selves and me as a self.  
I am not the centre of the universe but I do experience 
myself as part of the contemporary technological, historical 
and environmental universe. Thus, I am a participant in life. 
Nor am I at the centre of life. Classical Hellenist 
philosophies were created in response to different problems 
and within a different world. Thus, they reflect differing 
aspects of the human condition. Contemporary existential 
philosophy, to which I subscribe, constitutes a co-creative 
evolution of being and becoming. To my mind, co-creative 
evolution consists in global phenomena. Within co-creative 
evolution, in each new point of view, or new level of 
consciousness, I transcend my previous position. In this 
process I note that there is nothing in the universe that tells 
me that it is organized to satisfy or fulfill my needs or 
preferences. I have no experience that any order and 
harmony of the universe is intended for my sake as a human 
being. Rather, as a co-creator in the universe, I structure the 
order and harmony of the universe. Phenomenological 
philosophy discloses that there cannot be another parallel, 
alternative, or distinct world. There is only the one in which 
I now live. It is in this world that I co-create, through a 







CONSTRUCTING CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY: THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF GEORGE TYRRELL (1861-1909)  
 
This section, like Section IV, is a case study, as it were, 
of the construction, or re-construction, of Christian 
theology. These two case studies are deliberately poles 
apart to illustrate that phenomenal theological construction 
transcends time and yet are united by a common problem. 
This is not an unusual approach. Kristina Stöckl made the 
same decision for her research. She chose the least similar 
poles in a post-totalitarian Eastern Orthodox philosophical 
discourse because they are related by the problematic they 
face. 34  
Within his studies, George Tyrrell has correctly noted 
that Christians in the early Church looked intellectually to 
the Gentile nations to find philosophical vessels to hold the 
spiritual treasures they could not find in the house of their 
spiritual birth. Through their engagement with diverse 
cultures the early Christians discovered a variety of 
contexts through which they could express the development 
of their interior and spiritual life and subsequent theological 
construction. 35 One context that has provided an 
intellectual forum, and continues to provide a philosophical 
forum to express the development of theological 
construction is found in the Roman Catholic experience of 
the so-called Modernist Movement of the early 20th 
century. This movement challenged scholasticism as the 
dominant theological method for Western theologians. 
During the early 20th century, the Magisterium of the 
Roman Church was exceptionally vigilant over initiatives 
within the Church to open its doors to the worlds of 
science, philosophy, and democracy. Such vigilance was 
the result of a suspicion of the historical-critical method of 
scriptural interpretation. Ironically, Ellen Leonard notes 
that Maude Petre saw the intent of the Modernists as 
“fighting to make the churches safe for democracy, rather 
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than undermine them.” 36 The Magisterium in George 
Tyrrell’s time reluctantly embraced anything that smacked 
of existential subjectivity. With the publication by Pius X 
of Lamentabili in 1907, as well as, the anti-modernist 
encyclical Pascendi published in 1907, the Roman Catholic 
Magisterium self-consciously, and with full intention, 
withdrew from participation in the philosophical debates 
developing outside post-reformation medieval culture. This 
withdrawal led to the continuing misperception that the 
Catholic Church was a monolithic fortress constituting a 
single public discourse for all her peoples, at all times, and 
thereby excluding any diversity.  
In spite of this withdrawal, the Church’s conservation 
of tradition is instructive for us today as we reflect on 
constructing Christian theology, individually and 
collectively. For example, as Christianity spread during the 
Patristic period, diverse views developed regarding both the 
manner and extent to which Hellenistic thinking should be 
used to interpret the revelation of the Christ in Jesus of 
Nazareth. Some early thinkers, such as Tertullian (160—
225 CE) and Tatian (120—173 CE) were passionately 
opposed to Hellenistic philosophy and culture for fear that 
its influence would adulterate the gospel. Others, such as 
Justin Martyr (112—165 CE) and Clement of Alexandria 
(150—212 CE) endeavoured to express the message of the 
gospel using Hellenistic philosophical concepts. 37 And 
notwithstanding Tertullian’s protestation, “What has 
Athens to do with Jerusalem?” Hellenistic philosophy 
entered the service of the Church. Henceforth, Christian 
philosophy, as the former Hellenistic and pagan way of 
thinking of Aristotle and Plato, became an ancillae 
theologiae for Christian theologians. The use of notions 
borrowed from traditions outside of Christianity’s own 
traditions, as George Tyrrell has noted, has always been a 
living part of the Christian traditio although not without 
controversy. Indeed, S. C. Carpenter has suggested that 
borrowing from outside the Catholic tradition is a trait of 
the Modernist theologian. Tyrrell, and those who with him 
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were the original Modernists, were theological re-
constructors, but they re-constructed theology in continuity 
with the ancient Church. However, despite their efforts the 
Aristotelianism of the Schoolmen and the pedagogical 
methods of the Friars, were not able to hold together the 
ancient faith within its legitimate historical development. 
Thus, historical criticism contributed to the break down the 
old order. But George Tyrrell and even Alfred Loisy, for a 
long time, were profoundly Catholic in intention and desire 
in attempting to up-date the faith. 38 Since the Second 
Vatican Council (1962—1965), the positive results of a 
critical scholarship, particularly within scripture study, due 
to Modernist thinking are apparent. 39 The modern trend in 
theology away from a singular scholastic approach and 
towards a diversified approach continues to develop and is 
fully in keeping with the Catholic Christian approach 
established at Vatican II.   
The diverse theological perspectives introduced through 
the Modernist theologians are, in fact, foundational to 
contemporary existential reflection on the construction of 
Christian theology in the life of the Christian. The hope for 
such critical reflection and diverse scholarship that is 
currently underway had been George Tyrrell’s desire 
according Maude Petre. Introducing one of his books she 
says: “Hence I have not feared to put in fragments, in spite 
of their lack of finish, for the sake of some flash of insight 
which they convey; and they will serve their purpose if they 
do what their author was always satisfied to do, namely to 
give the lead to some other mind which can carry the 
search a little further.” 40 Tyrrell, although not a politician, 
struggled with religion as a social way of life. He had this 
in common with William Gladstone. Tyrrell viewed 
theology as a partial interpretation of one’s social, and 
therefore, political life. He entered the Roman Catholic 
Church in 1879 and a year later he joined the Jesuits, the 
Society of Jesus. He was sympathetic to the difficulties 
experienced by Catholics in trying to reconcile scientific 
knowledge and thought with the traditional elements in 
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Roman Catholicism. He did distrust the science of his day. 
He “believed that the supernatural realities of faith should 
be defended by other means than those of rationalistic 
science. It was in fact, for him, the scientific pretensions of 
theology that were unjustifiable.” 41 Maude Petre and 
others have described his writings as having an apologetic 
intention, being meditative in approach, and somewhat 
mystical in content. 42 Tyrrell did not write for the 
uncritical thinker, but rather wrote as one who was in 
communion with his readers and their sensibilities. He was 
a cautious writer and did not write for the sake of novelty 
or popularity. He has noted that to depart from established 
conventions for merely selfish motives is licence, not 
liberty. 43  
That Greek thought may have saved the Christian 
message for the world was not part of Tyrrell’s 
understanding. Rather, he suggested that human intention, 
schooled in the Christian life, has preserved the Christian 
message. He writes that he sees intention guiding the 
process of preservation from first to last as leaven in the 
loaf. 44 Scholasticism, as a way of thinking, that 
accommodates revelation to secular form had little appeal 
to Tyrrell’s mind. The issue, for him, was how to recognise 
theology among the contemporary forms of order that serve 
the faithful seeking existential understanding. As a form of 
order, theology serves an institutional Christianity. For 
Tyrrell, the vox populi as a source for theological thinking 
does not equate to the voice of the populace, that is, to 
public opinion. Rather, the vox populi consists of a 
collection of the best results of the thinking of the 
collective mind of the faithful. The vox populi is, in this 
sense, the sensus fidelium as reflected within the 
construction of Christian theology. Most discussions and 
philosophical treatments of Tyrrell’s theology occur within 
the historical context of the Modernist Crisis in the 
Catholic Church. However, David Schultenover proposes a 
variant approach to understanding Tyrrell’s theology. He 
claims that Tyrrell’s literary genre is intellectual history, 
70 
 
rather than institutional history. His study does not aim at 
describing the modernist movement but, rather, describing 
the intellectual development of a major contributor to the 
movement by focusing on the person as the key to his 
thought. 45  
Tyrrell lived at a time when religion seemed destined to 
be undermined by the vast amount of secular knowledge 
that was sweeping over the intellectual world. 46 
The explosion of secular knowledge threatened to 
discount the intellectual and meditative approach to 
religious experience and theological interpretation. It also 
constituted a threat to the Catholic intellectual life of the 
British Isles and the Continent. For this reason, Mary Green 
suggests that in Tyrrell’s day Catholic religious thought had 
not kept pace with English religious thought in general nor 
with the Catholic and the general religious thought on the 
Continent. 47 In short, Catholic theological thinking still 
lagged behind the advanced theological thought of the 
Reformation. David Wells notes that Tyrrell displayed in 
his writings an Irish heart but he possessed a German mind 
thus characterising him as straddling the Irish affective and 
the German intellectual worlds. 48  
Concerning Germanic influence in English thought, 
shortly before Tyrrell’s time, Joseph Gostwick correctly 
observed that German intellectual, meditative thinking 
could never be the result of knowledge founded on reason 
alone. Germanic intellectual thinking, characterised by 
intuition and immediate feeling, influenced the construction 
of Christian theology. Religious feeling was beginning to 
be taken seriously at this time and Gostwick observed that 
the “rights” of intuition and immediate feeling; rights long 
suppressed under the tyranny of logic according to him, 
were now allowed to be as valid as the conclusions of that 
reasoning process. 49 Such intuitive and immediate feeling 
nourished the intellectually meditative character of 
Tyrrell’s theology.  
Initially, scholasticism provided the context for 
Tyrrell’s thinking. However, Tyrrell soon realized that 
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scholasticism no longer met the needs of a modern age. In 
Leslie Lilley’s words, Tyrrell could no longer accept a 
demonstration of God supported by those “idols of the 
tribe,” that is, the Aristotelian conceptions of motion, 
causality, contingency, and finality. 50 Bernard Reardon 
suggests that some knowledge of Hegel’s philosophy, 
which rejected Aristotelian understanding, would help in 
comprehending the pattern of Tyrrell’s thinking. 51 Further, 
Percy Gardner interprets Tyrrell’s note that the process 
through which he, Tyrrell, had reached his present position 
will appear as a wavering, rather than as a straight line, a 
result that would facilitate his critic’s task, as indicating the 
Hegelian dialectic. 52  
A contemporary of Tyrrell, A. Boutwood, writing under 
the pseudonym Hakluyt Egerton, alludes to the meditative 
aspect of Tyrrell’s thinking. 53 When Tyrrell speaks of 
“Divine Immanence,” Egerton does not believe that Tyrrell 
means Pantheism, the doctrine that God is the substance of 
all finite things. Egerton wrote that, undoubtedly, Tyrrell 
believed that God is in man. But, by way of mere 
indwelling or as a part of man’s composite nature is not 
clear. 54 Egerton also noted that Tyrrell distinguished 
between the general experience of religion and the 
particular experience of revelation. Tyrrell did not refer to 
the cause of revelation, as if it were the same as the cause 
of religion, but referred to revelation by a description of its 
subjective character, as a psychological event. 55 This 
subjective insight, or psychological occurrence, is common 
to those reflecting upon the construction of Christian 
theology through an existential approach.  
The existential issues that Tyrrell addressed in Oil and 
Wine are as pertinent today as they were when he put pen 
to paper. In Oil and Wine, he represents to us the church as 
an existential school for the construction of Christian 
theology. In this school one needs to reflect dialectically 
between the moral and civic values distinguished by a 
separation of Church and State. In this dialectic, he notes, 
the Church has made an ethical contribution to the Western 
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social order and civilization. In turn, Western society has 
made its historical and particular contribution to the 
evolution of the Church. Further, he claims that this 
dialectic has been tested and confirmed through the 
experience of the faithful living in the world. The Church, 
as institution, Tyrrell notes, is leavened and softened by 
those kindlier manners and gentler laws that have been 
developed in the civilization that the Church once nurtured 
with the milk of the Gospel. 56 When these kindlier 
manners and gentler laws, as he described them, are re-
introduced into the Church they restore a fresh spirit and 
bear fruit once more, as re-constructed Christian theology. 
An individual’s response to these kindlier manners and 
gentler laws will always be unequal. That is, no two 
responses will be identical but hey may be similar. Such 
inequality is accounted for by the many personal factors in 
the individual’s make-up that determine the receptivity of 
the spirit.  
Tyrrell speaks of the oil and wine metaphorically. He 
means not the oil and wine characteristic of joy and 
happiness, but rather characteristic of medicine. He cites 
the physician in the gospel story who bound the traveller’s 
wounds. Metaphorically, the oil and wine clear the eye of 
the soul so that it may see more clearly in reflecting and 
constructing a Christian theology. In other words, the oil 
and wine enable one to see beyond the visible confines of 
the institutional church and perceive it as a school for 
constructing a Christian theology. Having clearer eyes, we 
see the elements of Catholic Christianity that some other 
Christians, as well as non-Christians, cannot see.  
Since Christians live in community certain questions 
arise: What type of religious community is available for the 
faithful? What type of Church do the faithful constitute? To 
Tyrrell, it seemed that no public consensus existed 
regarding the constitution of a unified religious community 
or Church. He was convinced, like William Gladstone, that 
without such consensus, individual Christians drift in their 
life into psychological angst. Living in the Victorian 
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England, Tyrrell’s ideas reflected the social construct of a 
nation and church unified within a common culture. 
Gladstone, as well, presupposed this to be the case. It is 
clear that Tyrrell had in view the existence of a community 
composed of the greater number of citizens who 
supposedly shared a common culture and belief system but, 
in fact, there was no such identifiable community. Without 
the support of a common culture and religious belief 
system the faithful run the risk of spiritual harm, Tyrrell 
believed. According to him, for many of the faithful, 
religion played no authentic part in their lives due to the 
lack of a common culture and belief. He has remarked that 
when no public unity of faith or practice is professed, the 
great mass of those who depend on imitation and 
gregariousness for their belief are lost to religion. 57 
Subsequently, they lose the institutional church as an 
existential school for the construction of a Christian 
theology. The institutional Church, as an existential school 
for the construction of a Christian theology, cannot be 
merely a theoretical entity without any recognisable visible 
form. Tyrrell clearly believes that individuals require some 
concrete form of institutional religious expression from 
which to construct Christian theology.  
In External Religion, Tyrrell attempted to sketch out his 
understanding of an organized religion and its role in the 
construction of a Christian theology. At a time in which the 
classical notion of natural law had not yet been dislodged 
from public acceptance, Tyrrell readily accepted its 
principles. Thus, he presumed that religion and civilization 
are natural to humanity. However, humanity is capable of 
perverting religious and civilized activity. John Ralston 
Saul provides an example of such misuse of reason in his 
extensive work, Voltaire’s Bastards in which he attempts to 
account for corrupted Western thinking. 58 Theology 
traditionally serves to interpret religion. Like reason, 
theology can be perverted and diverted from its proper 
purpose and made to serve particular polemical ends. 
Religion, as an expression of our inborn spiritual instincts 
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and appetites, requires theology as an interpreter to help the 
faithful reflect upon a proper construction of Christian 
theology. Tyrrell notes that the Christian life does not 
confine itself to concrete experience alone but it also 
encounters the transcendent. The Christian shares in the life 
of God through participation in the divine life as offered 
and revealed by God. The unique example of this shared 
life is Jesus of Nazareth. The life of Jesus the Messiah, 
being an incarnated life, is the prototype of God’s spirit in 
the flesh. Thus, like Jesus, Christians being incarnated lives 
of God’s spirit listening to God’s voice within, 
(individually) they will recognise God’s voice when it 
speaks from without (collectively).  
How is it that the institutional Church is a school for the 
construction of Christian theology? Tyrrell does not answer 
this question in the traditional manner. Unlike Gladstone, 
he sees beyond the question of baptism as the sacrament 
incorporating the believer into the Church and looks to a 
transcendent relationship between the believer and God. 
The individual’s response to an invitation from God 
discloses a transcendent relationship between the believer 
and God. The construction of Christian theology requires 
the co-operation of two distinct entities. The first is God 
and the second is the individual believer. Within this 
dialectic, initiative meets initiative, and subject meets 
subject. As Tyrrell notes: “It is, from beginning to end, a 
matter of choice; first of His choice, then of ours.” 59 The 
inadequacy of classical philosophical formulation requires 
ever-newer forms to be generated from existential 
philosophy for the construction of Christian theology. 
Classically the philosophical form of analysis reasons from 
cause to effect. Given the classical ontological 
understanding, God is posited as the first cause or the 
unmoved mover. The inevitable result of this understanding 
has been an idealistic deism precluding a divine encounter 
within the world. The unmoved mover cannot be moved to 
engage creation. By way of contrast, an existential or 
phenomenological way of thinking reflects the interior 
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awareness of God as revealed in personal experience. 
Tyrrell concluded that an existential school of constructing 
Christian theology develops from knowing God in personal 
experience more than from external observation.  
Tyrrell notes in Lex Credendi that if we see Christ’s 
spirit in us, we become responsive to it. We know the spirit, 
not through metaphysical insight, but through thoughts, 
feelings, utterances and affects the spirit has upon us. In 
short, we know the spirit existentially. Tyrrell notes that, 
notwithstanding objective truth, feelings are more accurate 
than metaphysical ideals when it comes to understanding 
the truth. He distinguishes between the objective truths of 
the intellect and the subjective truths of feelings. In short, 
he claims that what we feel is truer than what we know. 
Walter Kasper echoes the same thought in his lecture “The 
Church and Contemporary Pluralism.” 60 After examining 
the thought of the ancient Greeks, Tyrrell writes that the 
Greek philosopher was inclined to be more interested in 
Christology than in Christ; in the metaphysics of the Spirit, 
than in the fruits of the Spirit; in the theory of life than in 
living. 61 It follows then, that the believer may give of 
himself or herself to God’s work, God’s will, God’s cause, 
yet not to God, and thus fail to participate fully in the 
construction of Christian theology. The Church, as an 
existential school for the construction of Christian 
theology, constitutes the developmental context for the 
individual Christian’s interior growth. The Christian 
faithful live in medio ecclesia, that is, within the believing 
community. As a result, Tyrrell understands the ecclesia in 
a personal and existential sense, that is, 
phenomenologically, rather than in an institutional or 
bureaucratic sense, that is, ideally.  
The Russian existentialist philosopher Nicolas 
Berdyaev suggests that George Tyrrell’s model of Church 
is strikingly similar to the Russian notion of sobornost. 
Berdyaev records that Tyrrell does not set Protestant 
individualism against Catholic authoritative doctrine, but 
he sets forth a peculiar spiritual collectivity, similar to 
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sobornost or Russian Orthodox “Catholicity.” 62 Berdyaev 
explains that in this conception the church is indeed an 
external objective reality. However, sobornost is not a 
collective reality that stands higher than the human person. 
Rather, it is the highest spiritual power in the human person 
that enters communion with the living and the dead in a 
particular historical and cultural context. In this sense, the 
Church is an adaptation of spirit to existential conditions. 
Thus, the Church is not merely an existential organization, 
although it manifests itself in that form. Rather, it offers a 
life-style that consists of a real community in Christ. In 
Christ, the church consists of freedom and love. Thus, no 
external authority constitutes it.  
Similarly, in discussing eternal life, Baron Friedrich 
von Hügel, in his understanding, does not require that 
religious life conform to a specific institutional practice. 
However, some form of institutional context is required to 
accommodate religious practice. Baron von Hügel, a 
contemporary of Tyrrell, wrote about Christian life in 
medio ecclesia. The combining of the Christian life with 
institutionalism has led to much misunderstanding and to a 
frustrating problematic in the interpretation of the religious 
experience in our time. For von Hügel, the Christian life is 
eternal life. Through his studies, he discerned that the 
construction of Christian theology, which ultimately 
equates with eternal life, reflects our earthly existential 
condition. In his book, Eternal Life, he addresses various 
existential issues that arise concerning the Christian life. He 
is aware of “embodied truth” and remains conscious of the 
body, of the senses, and the physical environment within 
the development of the spiritual and religious life. By this 
awareness he wished to avoid the problems and conflicts of 
his time over church authority. However, he could not 
avoid, or even minimise, these existential questions totally 
and he engaged in the construction of Christian theology as 
an existential activity. 63 Von Hügel concluded, therefore, 
that eternal life, which began with conscious reflection 
upon the Christian life was not divorced from the human 
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context but somehow, is incarnated in human activity and 
religious practice. Like Tyrrell, von Hügel believed that 
spiritual beliefs have practical consequences. “Eternal 
Life,” he writes, “is no substitute for either God or man; but 
it is the activity, the effect, of God, or of man, or of both.” 
64  
Tyrrell observed that the construction of Christian 
theology had emerged more from individual example and 
the schools of theology than from the formal doctrines of 
the institutional Church. Historical criticism shows us that 
all substantial advancement has been the work, not of 
officials, but of individuals almost in opposition to 
officials; not of a system, but of those who have, to some 
extent, corrected and modified the system. The modern 
understanding of ecclesial organization, as taught by 
Vatican II, reflects Tyrrell’s preferred understanding of in 
medio ecclesia. However, Tyrrell expanded his 
understanding of the ecclesia to include the world as the 
place or school wherein one may ponder the Divine. This 
was a prophetic insight on his part. Critical reflection on 
our worldly experience is current in contemporary 
spirituality and anthropological theological thinking. As 
believers, critical reflection on our experience confirms our 
world as divine. Tyrrell notes that to believe in the Church, 
as a Catholic, is to believe in humanity. He believes that to 
regard the world outside the Church as God-forsaken and to 
deny that God works and reveals himself in human history 
is a subtle and dangerous form of atheism.  
Today, Catholic theologians recognize that Tyrrell 
anticipated some of the thinking of Vatican II. He called 
upon the Church to deconstruct the very concepts of 
medievalism that were incapable of meeting the needs of 
the time. Tyrrell set about to analyse the experience of faith 
by using philosophical and scientific insights derived from 
his context. If Tyrrell did not directly influence, he 
certainly anticipated, the nouvelle théologie of theologians 
like Hans Urs von Balthasar and Yves Congar, whose 
thinking emerged after World War II, and played a 
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significant role at the Second Vatican Council. I suggest, as 
well, that Tyrrell anticipated the neo-Thomistic revival of 
Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson and the transcendental 
Thomism of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan. Tyrrell 
was among those Catholic theologians who first recognised 
that philosophy had moved beyond the reified 
scholasticism, which had developed by the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Theology, Tyrrell maintained, must 
now engage anew with the world in order to interpret the 
Christian experience as opposed to reminiscing about 
romanticised visions of the past. What we need, he seems 
to have maintained, for constructing Christian theology is 
an existential philosophy recognizing current political, 
social and religious issues. Doubt, or the crisis of 
existential meaning, often arises from the failure of 
outdated ideas to carry the meaning of our present 
experience. When this happens, we are disposed to question 
what we previously believed, but we do not doubt what we 
previously experienced. Questioning our previous 
experience, not doubting what we previously believed, 
assists us in discarding our outdated concepts of 
interpretation. Doubting belief, unlike questioning 
experience, is rooted in a loss of faith in God and a 
subsequent replacement by faith in ourselves. This is an 
unhealthy, narcissistic attitude.  
In our acts of worship and adoration, it is an error on 
our part to remain focused on the creature and not 
recognise the action of the Creator. Our experience reveals 
that the need to adore and to worship constitutes our 
humanity. Our experience further reveals that adoration or 
worship makes possible a personal opportunity for the 
construction of Christian theology. In worship and in 
adoration the barriers around the self are transcended and 
we participate in the eternal life of that which is Infinite 
while, at the same time, acknowledging that which is finite 
in our own life. According to Maude Petre, a personal and 
intimate friend of George Tyrrell, we come to participate in 
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the revelation of God’s infinite life through interior 
knowledge gained in acts of adoration and worship. 65  
George Tyrrell left no systematic account of his views. 
His short life was largely taken up in controversy. 
However, upon examination, two significant insights 
become evident. First, Tyrrell contrasted the concept of an 
unchanging and formalized truth with a living and dynamic 
experience of the faith. Second, he held that a belief is best 
tested through experience and subsequently evaluated by 
the fruit it bears in this life. A belief, for Tyrrell, is not a 
theoretical concept formulated with the aid of a 
metaphysical philosophy. A belief is more than that. It 
results in practical consequences that affect the temporal 
life. Further, the consequences of belief are not limited to 
temporal life. Beliefs that prove fruitful re-present to us the 
realities of the eternal Christian life. It is in and through our 
practical, that is, temporal or existential situation that we 
enter upon the eternal Christian life.  
With the death of Tyrrell in 1909 the Modernist 
influence in English Roman Catholicism came to an end. 
Some of the laymen who had been connected by ties of 
personal friendship with the Modernist leaders were, for a 
time, suspect by Church authorities. Wilfrid Ward was 
denounced to Rome for heresy, but cleared. Baron von 
Hügel, who had introduced Tyrrell to New Testament 
criticism, held views close to the Modernist view of 
history, but far removed from the immanent philosophy of 
the Modernists. Thus, Francis Cardinal Bourne, in whose 
diocese von Hügel resided, did not condemn the Baron. 
With respect to Maude Petre she thought that the Modernist 
agenda was becoming a “lost cause” in her day. In contrast 
to her views, however, Ellen Leonard is more optimistic 
and along with her I recognize the Modernist agenda as 
influencing questions that are very much alive today. 
Leonard writes: Maude “finally came to the conviction that 
a lifetime, even a long lifetime like hers, was too short for 
the kind of changes the ‘modernists’ had envisioned. 
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Although modernism might be dead, the questions with 
which it dealt were still very much alive.” 66  
The construction of Christian theology arises within the 
life of the faith community composed of individuals who 
seek to relate to each other and express their common 
meaning. Theological constructions have their foundation 
in lived history, not in the so-called historical problem, but 
in problems that arise in the existential events of history 
that, in turn, bind individuals and communities together. In 
my theological construction, I take seriously the legacy of 
the Enlightenment and George Tyrrell as influencing my 
thought and view religion as an historical and human 
phenomenon. To place on record what has been perceived 
as taking place is not history, but only information, or data. 
History depends upon that which is consciously selected for 
recording. The truth of history depends on existential 
interpretation. Thus, the question arises: What is the nature 
of those principles determining what is selected and 
recorded by historians and to what degree have those 
principles been held by later interpreters in the same field? 
The past cannot be seen as hardened and dead, with respect 
to the present, nor can those individuals whose lives have 
shaped the past be ignored. Though they may be dead, 
awareness of their contribution to the common good 
continues to shape the present. The past exists, not by 
virtue of right, but by virtue of being useful and significant 
to the present. If human history is to have any meaning and 
influence in Christian theological construction, it must be 
related to the lives, purposes and wills of the men and 
women through whose experiences it has been revealed as 
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I present this short section as the second case study of 
Christian theological construction that I am examining in 
this book. This section is not intended as an historical 
survey of the development of Orthodox Canon Law. I do 
not offer an interpretation of particular collections or codes 
of canon laws. Nor do I assess the laws themselves as to 
whether or not they are still applicable to our current 
situation. Further, I am not examining the relationship 
between culture and Orthodox Canon Law. Nor, in this 
examination will I be comparing Roman Canon Law with 
Orthodox Canon Law. Yet, elements from each of the 
above will be discussed in the following pages. So why do I 
undertake this case study? I do so in response to Alexander 
Schmemann’s call for a re-examination of the controversy 
over Orthodox Canon Law in America. According to 
Schmemann, “certain assumptions on which the whole 
controversy in America seems to be grounded and which 
are in fact a very serious distortion of the Orthodox 
canonical tradition,” need to be re-examined. 67 I believe 
that some of the certain assumptions that contribute to the 
very serious distortions of Canon law, of which he speaks, 
are philosophical and therefore transcend the law itself. 
What I discuss, then, may be applied to the Eastern and 
Western traditions of Canon Law leading to a further 
clarification of the intent of the law in either tradition. That 
is so since the legislators of each tradition may make 
accommodation and modification to the laws in light of any 
existential philosophical perspectives raised in Christian 
theological construction. Thus, this case study focuses a 
phenomenological philosophical interpretation of law as it 
is experienced in every-day life. That is to say, I do not 
presume that any law is a given datum from a source 
external to experience. Law, being socially constructed, is 
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not an ideally given construct. For this reason any process 
of social construction needs to be philosophically analyzed 
to determine how it gives birth to law.  
Earlier in this work, I offered a preliminary explanation 
of my philosophical development from a classical 
perspective to a phenomenological one. This was done in 
Section II. Some readers, those primarily interested in 
Canon Law, may choose to continue reading here and only 
later return to read the account of my particular 
philosophical point of view.  
Even though law is not an ideal construct I understand 
it to be a “real phenomenon” in that it has intelligibility 
independently of my personal desire. That is, the law is 
“there” whether I like it or not. I cannot wish it away when 
it does not serve my interests or when I find it restrictive of 
my interests. The law is there because it is a social reality 
that has arisen within the collective consciousness of 
individuals living in community. The social construction of 
reality, in which I participate, is undertaken in light of a 
philosophical basis, which depends upon my individual 
experience interpreted in a given culture. My cultural 
experience is expressed in philosophical terms. Sometimes 
these philosophical terms become cloudy, or obscure, such 
that they impede my personal growth rather than promote 
my personal growth. This impediment occurs on an 
individual basis as well as a collective basis. The religious 
philosopher, George Grant, suggests a remedy for this 
cloudy and obscure situation. He said: “In a period when 
meaning has become obscure, or to use another language, 
when God seems absent, the search must be for a new 
authentic meaning that includes within itself the new 
conditions that make that search necessary. It must be a 
philosophical and theological search.” 68 He presumes, as I 
do, that God is required for humans to make sense and 
meaning out of their lives.  
The search for a new authentic meaning, as suggested 
by Grant, is inherent in the broad philosophical and 
theological point of view, which underpins the formulation 
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of Canon Law – both East and West. I am not concerned, at 
this point, with the laws themselves, but rather with the 
social point of view, understood philosophically and 
theologically, that has occasioned their construction. 
Therefore, I focus on the disciplines that are auxiliary to 
and supportive of canon law. Here my thinking follows that 
of Panteleimon Rodopoulos, who has identified two such 
auxiliary disciplines. The first is theology proper and the 
second is the subordinate discipline of the science of law. 
The first, he notes, encompasses dogmatics, ethics, 
patrology, liturgics, and pastoral theology all relating to the 
Old and New Testaments of the Christian Scriptures. The 
second, pertains to the science of law, includes a 
philosophy of law in general and, Greco-Roman Law and 
Hebrew law in particular and, laws of the Nation State in 
which the Orthodox Church is present. 69  
The problem of Orthodox Canon Law and its 
development in America has not been solved by various 
“attempts simply to ‘reduce’ it to some pattern of the past” 
according to Alexander Schmemann. 70 The solution, I 
suggest, is to be found in the re-construction of the 
philosophical and theological approach as previously noted 
by Grant. I believe that Schmemann is correct when he says 
that something has happened in the Church and in the 
world that “requires from theology a new effort of 
reflection a renewed ‘reading’ of Tradition.” 71 This section 
then is my meager attempt at a new reflection on Canon 
Law, Eastern and Western, in our contemporary North 
American context. Schmemann joins Nicholas Afanasiev in 
noting this change, which I believe is an evolutionary one 
and in keeping with our current understanding of the nature 
of philosophical development. He says that “the face of the 
earth is changing; mankind is entering unknown and 
unexplored paths, and we ourselves, just like our children, 
do not know under what new conditions we will be living.” 
72 The concern for the church arises within her self-
consciousness, that is, the experience of her present 
presence not the experience of her past life, nor any 
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imaginary anticipated life, which is yet to be rendered 
concrete. Within this self-conscious philosophical point of 
view, the past is memory and the future is fiction, with 
neither presenting themselves in the present. Marshall 
McLuhan, an early pioneer in the philosophy of 
communications media, being interviewed in 1977 on the 
future of the Church said: “I would say it is a wide open 
question whether the Church has any future at all as a 
Greco-Roman institution. It would be a good time to be 
Russian Orthodox: they split off from Rome because it was 
too literate. The Eastern Church is an “ear” Church; Rome 
was always very far along the visual road to visual power.” 
73 My examination of the assumptions of Orthodox Canon 
Law continues with five examples of theological 
construction as outlined below.  
  
Theological Construction and the Philosophical Purpose of 
Canon Law  
 
Humans, unlike other living creatures, have no species-
specific environment. Our environment is necessarily 
structured by our own instinctual organizational abilities. 
Our human world is open to, but not limited to, biological 
existence. That which characterizes humanity is a socio-
cultural variable. There is no nature, as a biological 
substratum, that determines what makes us human. Rather, 
something in our environment works with us to make 
humanness happen. Our humanity is thus determined 
within an anthropological context. It is unique to humans 
that our habitual activity in one area generates the context 
for deliberation and innovation in other areas of our 
activity. Deliberation and innovation, which reveal intent, 
are creative activities that remove the need to perpetually 
invent solutions to identical human problems.   
Phenomenologically, society is conceived as a social 
product. Phenomenologically, society subjectively reveals 
reality in its relational form. Similarly, law is conceived as 
a social product. Law subjectively reveals reality in its 
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relational form, as well. Law that leaves out subjectively 
conceived relational reality and is based merely on theory 
is inadequate law. The institution of law is “dead” unless 
“brought to life” in subjective human action. Thus, I 
inquire philosophically: What is the scope of the meaning 
of law within the activity of the faithful? Is there an area of 
life’s activity regulated by law in comparison to the area of 
life’s activity that is unregulated? I do recognize that the 
philosophical foundation of law is capable of attaining an 
intelligible autonomy and independence from its social or 
community base. Law changes as society changes. A 
question I have often asked myself is: Institutionally, is the 
law to keep “outsiders” out and “insiders” in? The 
relationship between law and its social, that is, 
philosophical base is a dialectical one, not a mechanical 
one. Thus, when law becomes reified, or mechanized, it 
becomes dehumanized and constitutes a world over which 
humans have no control. According to Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckman, “another way of saying this is that 
reification is the apprehension of the products of human 
activity as if they were something else than human 
products—such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, 
or manifestations of divine will.” 74   
According to John Erickson, over time, a canon came to 
be understood as a rule, made by a council rather than a 
norm that reflected the mind of the Church, which defined 
one’s status within the Church.  
This shift in the meaning of ‘canon’ is but one aspect of 
the veritable metamorphosis that the canonical tradition 
underwent following the conversion of Constantine and the 
establishment of Christianity as the favored, and then the 
official, religion of the Roman empire. The Church came to 
enjoy many of the rights, privileges, exemptions and 
benefits that the pagan cults earlier had enjoyed under 
public law. In turn, however, its ‘constitution’ and 
structures had to be clearly defined and expressed in terms 
of law, if only because government officials needed to 
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know who legally represented the Church. Here earlier 
canonical literature was unsatisfactory.” 75  
It has been suggested that civilization is the art of living 
in towns such that that everyone does not know everyone 
else. 76 Traditionally, the art of civilized living has required 
a philosophical, theological, political and legal outlook on 
the part of the members of society. As civilized societies 
the Orthodox Churches lay greater stress on the mystical 
and invisible elements of their constitution, which is why 
they have not assigned a secular and legalistic character to 
their organization. 77 Orthodox Churches are often 
understood in terms of their social organization, their 
structures, while their philosophical and theological 
purposes are ignored or misunderstood. 78 Philosophically, 
the ecclesia in secular Greek connotes a community being 
‘called out’ to an assembly in its own right. For Christians 
the ecclesia constitutes itself through a particular 
theological construction. Thus, philosophical and 
theological discernment is needed on the part of the 
members of the ecclesial community to fulfill their spiritual 
purpose. Erickson notes this required discernment by 
members of the Church and remarks: “For the most part, 
even when dealing with new situations, they do not attempt 
to ‘make’ laws but rather to ‘find’ the Church’s canon, 
whether in scripture or in tradition.” 79  
Canon Laws are better understood not as subjecting a 
person to subservience but, rather, as attempting to 
guarantee the freedom of the faithful within the Church.  
That is the essential difference between Canon and Civil 
Law. In an Orthodox understanding of the theological 
construction of Canon Law, the Church is to provide 
herself with the necessary means of survival as a divine 
social reality. Over time the community of faith came to be 
associated with a juridical organization. This does not mean 
that the community of faith was reduced to a legal 
institution. However, this distinction is an important one in 
light of the Church’s philosophical and theological purpose 
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to guarantee the freedom of the faithful as reflected in its 
Canon Laws.  
  
Theological Construction and the Origin of Canon Law in 
the Will of God  
 
Law is capable of intelligible objectification. Such 
intelligible objectification allows law to survive the 
subjective moment that made the law. Intelligible 
objectification is signification, that is, the production of 
signs. A sign carries a specific intention to serve as an 
explicit indication of subjective meaning, but this meaning 
needs interpretation in light of its original context, which 
may not fit all cases of human experience. Here, I mean 
objectification phenomenologically, that is, as objectivity, 
not as objectivism, which is the classical understanding. 
Canon Law has its origin in a “face-to-face” encounter with 
the other, God. But Canons become detached from their 
original context as new encounters are experienced. By 
social convention, the legal system is distinguished from 
other sign systems since meanings often change as we 
speak. Signs, for instance, have fixed meanings, whereas, 
laws are truly symbols, not signs, whose meanings are not 
fixed. In effect, as symbolical, Canon Law makes present, 
as it were, the divine presence in my present moment.  
As a matter of fact, the Orthodox Churches never 
provided themselves with a complete system of canon law. 
The canons of the Ecumenical Councils, which they 
acknowledge as authentic, were regarded as expressions of 
the Churches’ nature, a jurisprudence of the Holy Spirit, as 
it were, reflecting the eternal order within the Body of 
Christ. These Churches never formed themselves into a 
juridical super-government and never looked upon 
themselves as a means by which to exercise an effective 
control over all members of the Church. 80 However, not all 
Orthodox share this view. Panteleimon Rodopoulos has 
written: “If God grants me life, I shall attempt to compose 
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as full a system as possible of the Canon Law of the 
Orthodox Catholic Church” 81  
John Dewey and James Tufts, writing from within a 
civil perspective, offer this insight, which assists in 
understanding Orthodox Canon Law. The obligation to 
obey the law is not “this is the custom,” or “our fathers did 
so”; rather, the faithful accept Christ as their God and 
lawgiver. 82 From within an ecclesial perspective, 
Rodopoulos writes: “Within the Church, the will of Jesus 
Christ prevails and is sovereign, not as the will of one 
standing outside the Church, but as the will of the Head of 
the body of the Church, through whom the faithful are 
united in the communion of the new people of God.” 83 
From this understanding, the Latin Church has the 
opportunity to learn two lessons according to Johaness 
Neumann. The first is that “the juridical order of the 
Church ‘grew’ out of various social presuppositions” and 
the second is that canonical norms are limited and 
conditioned by time, which prevents them from becoming 
permanent. 84  
From a Latin perspective, it is only when Canon Law 
accepts social changes that the Church can achieve her 
purpose as intended by Pius XII, which is that the Church 
should form humanity according to the law of Christ by 
adaptation to the actual conditions of time and place 85 It is 
historically evident that the faithful are free to change and 
to create forms of Church life but these forms are not 
always correctly constructed. There cannot be a single, nor 
permanent, canonical formulation because every historical 
period has its own canonical consciousness. Consciousness 
is only of the present, not the past or future. Therefore, 
Canon Law, consciously formulated, can only reflect the 
present existential context of the faithful. It must be 
remembered that not one of Christ’s commandments has 
the status of a positive norm. His commandments are 
eternal, immutable, and all relate to dogmas concerning the 
Church. Thus, there is no true separation between divine 
and human law. There is only a philosophical and 
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theological distinction to enable the faithful to discern the 
will of God.  
Patrick Viscuso has described the development of 
ecclesiastical law as the growth of the theandrical 
commonwealth of the Logos in the world. 86 Thus the 
Canons are incarnations of God’s mind for the 
circumstances in which the faithful find themselves. The 
reduction of canon law to mere temporal law is not possible 
because its source within the theandrical commonwealth is 
divine. In Eastern and Western understanding Canon Law 
is related to suffering for the sake of the Gospel and 
Church. In short, Canons are extensions of the Gospel, 
which, in turn, reflect the work of redemption of the Word 
Incarnate through the will of God.  
  
Theological Construction and Time in Canon Law  
 
The world of everyday life is structured in space and in 
time. Spatial construction of the world of everyday life has 
little to do with law except that my space intersects with the 
space others. The temporality of the past, the present and 
the future, influences the law. This time is inter-
subjectively experienced by members of the community in 
which the social construction of Canon Law is undertaken 
within the sequence of past, present and future events. 
Thus, law, as is language, is “capable of becoming the 
objective repository of vast accumulations of meaning and 
experience, which it can preserve in time and transmit to 
following generations.” 87 Theological construction seeks 
philosophical unity. George Grant has noted: “The function 
of the philosopher is…to think how the various sides of 
truth that have made themselves explicit in history may be 
known in their unity.” 88 The teachings of Jesus, upon 
which Canon Law is founded, do not have their origin 
within a bicameral mind, characteristic of scholastic 
philosophy. Rather, they have their origin within the 
consciousness of a unified mind, characteristic of a 
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phenomenological philosophy. Insightfully, in support of 
this understanding, Julian Jaynes writes of Jesus’ intent:  
The attempted reformation of Judaism by Jesus can be 
construed as a necessarily new religion for conscious men 
rather than bicameral men. Behavior must now be changed 
from within the new consciousness rather than from Mosaic 
laws carving behavior from without. Sin and penance are 
now within conscious desire and conscious contrition, 
rather than in external behaviors of the decalogue and the 
penances of temple sacrifice and community punishment. 
The divine kingdom to be regained is psychological not 
physical. It is metaphorical not literal. It is ‘within’ not in 
extensor. 89  
The history of Christianity, as an asocial construction, 
is not true to its founder. The construction of the Christian 
Church seems to be perpetually influenced by bicameral 
thinking that takes away from the inner conscious kingdom 
of agape.  
History occurs through time. And through her historical 
forms the Church exists. Also, history abides in the Church. 
In the Church and through the Church the historical process 
reflects the social construction through time. 90 In her 
history the civil and public constructions of the Church, her 
Eastern experience, reflect the national and social 
composition of the Roman Empire. 91 Although, the Church 
may follow civil laws and orders of the state, these laws 
and orders are not the source of Canon Law. Therefore, as 
abnormal canonical constructions they will be eliminated 
with the passage of time. We know that social agents, 
collectively and individually, bring about change. Some 
change is intended and some change is not. The activity of 
these social agents, as Dewey and Tufts correctly note, 
occurs “in an organized world of action; in social 
arrangement and institutions. So far as such combinations 
of individuals are current or stable, their nature and 
operations are definitely formulated and definitely 
enforceable.” 92 Except for being “definitely enforceable” 
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this observation applies to the social construction of 
Orthodox Canon Law within its historical context.  
In due time, asks Ivan Žužek, will there be a common 
code of Canon Law for the Orthodox Churches? His 
answer, given about forty years ago, is an optimistic one 
and judging by the current theological construction within 
American Orthodoxy some progress is being made in that 
direction. He writes: “Suffice it to say that, in view of the 
Codes that have already been revamped in some churches 
and of the valuable works published in recent years by 
Orthodox canonists, pessimism with regard to the task of 
preparing for a Common Code does not seem to be 
justified.” 93 Based on my experience I cannot agree with 
his optimism. In the contemporary social construction of 
American society there is no opportunity for Orthodoxy to 
acquire a uniform identity. America’s historical and current 
social development is characterized by a multinational 
social construction. This multinational social construction 
presents a challenge, from a cultural point of view, as 
Orthodoxy attempts to integrate into American society. 
This multinational social construction presents the 
possibility for a philosophical and theological approach to 
integration within American culture, not from a classical 
and traditional point of view that presumes identification 
between Orthodoxy and culture but, rather, from a socially 
constructed point of view that presents a dynamic 
understanding of the relationship between Orthodoxy and 
culture.  
Protestantism and Catholicism in their own way 
distinguish between the jus humanum and the jus 
ecclesiasticum. However, to the bicameral mind these two 
jurisdictions, the jus humanum and the jus ecclesiasticum, 
are separate and have acquired a certain self-containment in 
the modern context. The jus humanum, as a separate legal 
concept, was unknown to the Orthodoxy of the ancient 
Church as well as to the Byzantine theologians and 
philosophers of the 12th Century. Since the Church’s 
Canon Law arises from the essence of the believing 
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community, not any external structure developed over and 
in time, the Canon Laws do not establish the organization 
of the Church as a mechanism but “are a kind of canonical 
interpretation of the dogmas for a particular moment of the 
Church’s historical existence” within the temporal order. 94 
In short, an Orthodox understanding is that the canons 
express the eternal in the temporal.  
  
Theological Construction and Canon Law in Discipline and 
Conscience  
 
According to Roscoe Pound, in North America a 
nineteenth century phenomenon was that many jurists 
believed they had developed a self-sufficient science of law 
not in need of any philosophical apparatus.” 95 Yet, it is 
obvious that there are social issues requiring legal 
philosophical thinking. One is the need for general security 
and peace and order. Another is the need for continual 
compromises because of the continual changes in society. 
Thus, legal philosophers sought to standardize these social 
needs through a universal law that would last forever. In 
ancient Greece, Pound tells us, Demosthenes instructed an 
Athenian jury that there are four reasons the law ought to 
be obeyed. One, because laws were given by God; two, 
laws formed a tradition taught by wise men; three, because 
laws were deduced from an eternal and immutable code; 
and four, because laws expressed agreements within society 
binding its members to a moral duty to keep promises.  
This understanding led to a civil and non-Orthodox 
purpose of law. That is, a theory of authority of law which 
would impose reason, or rules, upon those who were 
subject to law in an amorphous legal order, that is, legal 
decisions made without regard to the subject or his or her 
context. This is the unique Greek contribution to the 
philosophy of law, the distinction of law itself apart from 
and the rules of law. This contribution was developed 
further during the transition of Greek law, which was 
particularly applicable to the citizens of a city, to the 
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universal understanding of law applicable to the inhabitants 
of the world. It must be remembered that Greek law applied 
differently to the citizen and non-citizen. As the feudal 
society of Europe broke down new forms of commerce, 
empirical colonization and the discovery of other 
continents gave the newly established nations the 
opportunity to construct a unified law within their national 
boundaries. In their construction, history illustrates that 
Protestant legalistic thinkers of the sixteenth century 
introduced a philosophical understanding that incorporated 
a divinely ordained state and a natural law. However, being 
based on independent reason, Protestant understanding of 
natural law was problematically divorced from theology, 
which was not the case with Catholic legal thinkers.  
According to Richard Horsley, Ernest Troeltsch 
advanced the view that Stoicism sets the basis for the 
preparation of the gospel with regard to the “law of nature” 
in Christian theology. But, this view has been challenged 
by Helmut Koester who discovered the phrase “law of 
nature” to be extremely rare prior to Philo of Alexandria 
with whom the concept was introduced. Yet, the law of 
nature idea is found in Cicero who wrote in Latin two 
generations earlier. Therefore, Horsely concludes that, “the 
parallel passages on the law of nature in Philo and Cicero 
derive ultimately from a Stoic tradition on universal law 
and right reason.” But that tradition in turn had been 
reinterpreted, “by a revived and eclectic Platonism upon 
which both Cicero and Philo drew” 96 Thus, the Stoic 
tradition understood the universe as governed by reason, or 
law, inherent in nature, which in its original state was 
identified with God, Horsely observed. Since Philo and 
Cicero clearly distinguished law from God, he maintains, 
we are led to look for the reshaping of Stoic natural law 
doctrine under Platonic influence prior to both Cicero and 
Philo.  
Philosophical eclecticism, in the sense of selecting what 
is best from different systems of thought, is an indication of 
a creative search for new combinations of ideas to replace 
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the philosophical schools of thought no longer adequate for 
our times. The idea of a divine lawgiver and the Stoic 
concept of natural law have been taken over by Hellenistic 
Jewish philosophy and subsequently by Christian 
philosophy. As a result, Catholic legal thinkers founded a 
system of laws based on limiting human action even 
through, they viewed humans as free rational creatures. 
Thus, in Latin law the limiting of human action and of 
positive law reflected the nature and the limits of the state. 
Whereas, canonists within Orthodoxy “must search out 
those norms for structure and conduct that necessarily arise 
from and conform to the very nature of the Church as the 
spirit-filled body of Christ,” and not those norms that 
characterize the nature and construct of the state. 97 A new 
period of growth within the ecclesial society, that is, the 
church, due to the decline traditional authority demanded a 
new philosophical discipline and conscience. The demand 
was to make a new legal order and to enact Canon Laws 
such that they would be a faithful copy of the natural ideal 
of law, in the Greek classical sense. “Nature” did not mean 
to the classical Greek thinkers, who lacked any 
understanding of evolutionary theory, what it means to 
contemporary thinkers. For ancient Greeks, the law’s 
nature was its perfection, not its dynamic being and 
becoming within a context of relationships. As imported 
into the North American context, classical law represented, 
not the nature of human kind, but rather the nature of civil 
government. In the West, law has developed to protect 
natural rights. It was not intended for the salvation of souls. 
Although, to the contrary it seems in the new Code of 
Western Canon Law, the last Canon in the book states that 
the salvation of souls is to be the supreme law in the 
Church (C.C. 1752).  
There are twelve conceptions of law distinguished by 
Pound that are worth reviewing at this point. One, law is 
divinely ordained and he cites the Mosaic laws and 
Hammurabi’s code as examples. Two, the law, as tradition, 
has been proved acceptable to the gods and thus humans 
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can follow it and act with security. Three, the law is the 
recorded wisdom of the sages who learned a safe way of 
life. Fourth, the law is a philosophically discovered system, 
which expresses the nature of things to which society’s 
members ought to conform. Fifth, the law is a declaration 
of an eternal and immutable moral code. Six, the law is a 
body of political agreements governing relationships 
among those living in a given society. Seven, [Western] 
law, as a reflection of Thomistic thinking is a reflection of 
divine reasoning governing the universe and what must be 
done within creation. Eight, the law is a body of commands 
of a sovereign authority and is supported by whatever 
supports the sovereign’s authority. This is a restatement of 
the classical Roman notion. Nine, the law is a system of 
norms discovered through human experience by which 
individuals realize their freedom together with the freedom 
of other like-minded individuals. Ten, the law is a system 
of principles, discovered philosophically to regulate the 
external action of members of society through juridical 
writings, which are based upon reason. This tenth point 
appeared in legislative commentary in the 19th century 
after the natural law theory declined in significance. 
Eleven, the law is a body of rules imposed upon society by 
the dominant class to further their own interest, consciously 
or unconsciously. And twelve, the law is made up of the 
dictates of the economic order or the social order with 
respect to human conduct discovered by observation and 
expressed in what would work, or not work, in the 
administration of justice as understood in the 19th century. 
98 Clearly, displaying such a rational philosophical bias, 
these twelve concepts could never form the basis of an 
Orthodox Canon Law in light of the foregoing discussion.  
That is so since the above legal perspective is designed 
to describe an institution that governs human actions. These 
perspectives are not oriented to salvation, even though it 
may be argued that they do depend upon some ultimate 
moral value upon which law is based. Among these twelve 
concepts listed by Pound, two elements are included that 
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limit the reform of law. The first is a static foundation that 
rejects any changes in human activity and, the second is an 
understanding of law that is mechanically absolute having 
been developed from a fixed starting point. As noted, civil 
law is to keep members of society in their proper place, not 
to lead to their salvation. “When St Paul exhorted wives to 
obey their husbands, and servants to obey their masters, 
and thus everyone to exert himself to do his duty in the 
class where the social order had put him, he expressed this 
Greek conception of the end of law,” says Pound. 99 But, 
the intent is changing in modern Western society. The 
interpretation of civil law is moving to include a 
metaphysical or a higher understanding than mere 
biological one. Proponents of this new theory insist that 
application of law involves not reason and logic only but 
also moral judgments made in particular situations and 
areas of behaviour, which are never exactly alike.  
In the formation of Orthodox Canon Law scripture or 
patristic authors are not the ground of the law’s theological 
basis. The ground of the theological basis for Orthodox 
Canon Law is the experience of the Church. The twelve 
points listed above by Pound, notwithstanding the words of 
Michael Melchizedek, up to a point sum up the Orthodox 
position of discipline and conscience in the formulation of 
Orthodox Canon Law. Melchizedek writes: “Church 
canons differ essentially from secular law in the premise 
that the original source of Canon law has its authority in the 
will of God concerning the church here on earth. 
Consequently, church law is in direct relation to the 
purpose of salvation; its time extending beyond this life 
into the next; its scope, including conscience; and its place, 
i.e. the universal church” 100  
  
Theological Construction and Everyday Life in Orthodox 
Canon Law  
  
Everyday life, being reality for the Orthodox faithful, is 
the locus for the theological construction of Canon Law. A 
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phenomenological analysis of this lived reality involves a 
subjective interpretation which leads to an intersubjective 
understanding among the faithful, that is, an understanding 
of life which is capable of being philosophically shared 
with others. In phenomenology there is no causal 
hypothesis as there is in classical philosophy. Nor is there 
any disclosure of the ontological status of the phenomena 
of everyday life. Every-day life appears to the conscious 
observer as already objectified. Such an objectified 
appearance is “the reality of everyday life [that] is 
organized around the ‘here’ of my body and the ‘now’ of 
my present.” 101 However, my “here and now” does not 
exhaust all reality, yet does embrace the past, the present 
and the future of which only my present consciousness is 
aware. Canon law reflects the here and now of everyday 
reality which we all share. However, such conscious reality 
is not identical with each person. This accounts for the 
conflicts in laws. Canon Law reflects nothing of one’s 
dreams, which are not shareable with others. The routine in 
everyday life is nonproblematic. However, changes in the 
routine of everyday life are problematic and occur as 
circumstances in everyday life are altered.  
The Orthodox Churches never formulated doctrine 
through any particular philosophical system. Rather, they 
developed and lived out the great traditions of the Patristic 
Fathers, their theology, spirituality and sacramental 
conception of the Church. Orthodoxy has traditionally 
defined itself in contrast to Roman Catholicism. This 
contrast is merely sociological. However, like Roman 
Catholicism the Orthodox Churches must face the 
challenge of the modern world. As a visible society of 
living beings, Orthodoxy has need of re-organization 
through the regulation of canons, which sanctify her 
present life and activities, as well as sanctify the 
relationships among its members. In this way, the visible 
Orthodoxy will be formed into a society, with supernatural 
authority, whose spiritual powers are exercised with proper 
social organization and spiritual government. Thus, she will 
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be distinguished from all secular authority by her spiritual 
nature, purpose and means.  
A final point is that the Church does not grow 
mechanically, but organically. There is a continuity of 
experience that reflects a living relationship, not an 
architectural relationship in Orthodoxy. Historically this 
organic relationship, which existed between the Moscow 
Bishop and the Russian missionaries sent to Alaska, was 
fractured by the Russian revolution. 102 The conscience of 
the Orthodox Churches cannot accept the thought of a 
mechanical adaptation to modern life, since that would 
constitute a secular victory over them by modern life. Out 
of their depths and essence, however, the Churches are 
searching to discover those organic forms of existence out 
of which to enact a redemptive role for Canon Law. The 
case is similar in Roman Catholicism. Eric McLuhan, son 
of Marshall McLuhan, has offered significant observations 
about the influence of the media on bureaucratic, 
administrative and institutional structures. Should there be 
a Vatican III it will be need to deal with contemporary 
social effects and the computerization of information. 
Orthodoxy may show a way for the future given Eric 
McLuhan’s remarks. He quotes his father’s words spoken 
in 1970. “In terms of, say, a computer technology, we are 
heading for cottage economies, where the most important 
industrial activities can be carried on in any little individual 
shack anywhere on the globe…In that sense, Christianity—
in a centralized, administrative, bureaucratic form—is 
certainly irrelevant” 103 Edward Moore’s reminder that the 
“Canon Law should apply to the members of a given 
Church calling itself Orthodox, but should not be used to 
validate or invalidate the existence of that Church, sums up 
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